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Abstract 
 
Central place theory that is the theory of location of urban settlements where goods and 
services are supplied was established by Walter Christaller in 1933, and expanded by 
August Lösch seven years later. The purpose of this thesis is to reinterpret their theories 
that have been forced to rely on descriptive and geometrical explanations from 
mathematical modelling perspective. Specifically, modelling for both of the locational 
principle of single good and the superimposition problem of market area networks are 
attempted by using mathematical programming comprising some constraints and an 
objective function. Moreover, the generalized model that both of the locational principle 
and the hierarchical structure are integrated is presented, and Lösch's and Christaller's 
theories are identified systematically on the generalized model. 
First of all, the market area theory of Lösch as a location problem of single good was 
modeled, and the extended model was developed in Chapter 2. When the process of 
locational equilibrium of firms based on the concept of demand cone and the normal profit 
is premised, the market area theory of Lösch can be formulated as the total demand 
maximization problem. In the previous studies concerning modelling the theory of Lösch, 
there were some problems in the formulation to reproduce theoretical central place system 
for the conditions such as assuming the behavior of firm and deriving the appropriate 
market area. On the other hand, the model of this thesis is able to reproduce the original 
Lösch’s theory because of formulating an objective to maximize total demand subject to 
the conditions of the nearest center hypothesis and the indifference principle. According to 
the results of applying the model in hypothetical areas, the model will be considered as an 
operational model of the market area theory of Lösch that enables the derivation of a 
realistic central place system under the more relaxed assumptions such as non-uniform 
vi 
 
population distribution. However, the firm obtains only the normal profit in the market area 
theory of Lösch that requires the free entry and the perfect competition to the market. Then, 
the total profit maximization problem that is antithetic to the total demand maximization 
problem was examined in consideration of realistic firm's behavior, and the two objectives 
were integrated by using multiobjective programming as the extension of the model for 
single good. The extended model is able to be regarded as a flexible model in handling the 
number of firms concerning the locational principle according to the results of applying in 
a hypothetical area.  
Next, the method of constructing a hierarchy in Lösch’s market area theory was 
examined, and the mathematical formulation of the superimposition problem of market 
area networks was attempted in Chapter 3. On the basis of the interpretation in the previous 
studies concerning the hierarchical arrangement of Lösch, it has been considered that two 
conditions of prioritizing location in particular sectors and maximizing the number of 
coincident market centers are the objectives of constructing a hierarchy. Then, the model 
that optimizes these two objectives was formulated as a combinatorial optimization and 
applied to the discrete lattice network of regular equilateral triangles. As a result, the 
central place system by Lösch was not reproduced, and the solution of the model was 
optimal for the purpose of prioritization of locating in particular sectors. Namely, it has 
been understood that the perspective towards the rationality of the entire system was lack 
from Lösch's process of constructing a hierarchy. Then, this thesis attempted to reinterpret 
Lösch's original intention in constructing a hierarchy, and developed the extended model 
based on the agglomeration effects. The application of the extended model revealed that the 
priority location in a particular sector was not an essential condition of the agglomeration 
of goods and the agglomeration effect by setting neighborhood ranges was able to derive 
more realistic central place hierarchy. 
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In Chapter 4, Christaller’s central place theory was reinterpreted based on the extended 
models both of the locational principle of single good and the hierarchical arrangement in 
the market area theory by Lösch. It is the core of a subject in this thesis to identify 
Christaller's and Lösch's theories systematically according to the extended models. When 
the objective function in the extended model of single good was expanded, the problem 
divided into three objectives—the maximum coverage of demand, the minimization of total 
distance traveled, and the minimization of the number of locations. From the perspective of 
the locational principle by combining three objectives, Christaller's central place theory 
was able to be identified as a generalized median problem in which second and third 
objectives are integrated. Because the generalized median problem is formulated as 
multiobjective programming, a different number of firms can be assumed in the case of one 
kind of good supply. Therefore, Christaller's central place theory was identified as the 
superimposition problem that one kind of good was associated with multiple market area 
networks. The application of the extended model for hierarchical arrangement indicated 
that central place system based on Christaller’s marketing principle was reproduced when 
the agglomeration effect was prioritized. 
Consequently, in this thesis, the generalized model of central place theory was 
presented by integrating the models both of the locational principle of single good and the 
hierarchical arrangement. When Lösch’s and Christaller's theories are identified using the 
generalized model, we can recognize that the former precedes the locational principle for 
single good while the latter prioritizes the agglomeration effect of goods. However, central 
place systems based on various locational principles and flexible hierarchical structures 
will be assumed in the real world. The generalized model of central place theory presented 
in this thesis is able to be considered as an analytical model that would be the touchstone of 
original theories to the real-world central place system. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
Introduction 
 
Central place theory—a theory for explaining the number, size and distribution of urban 
settlements that provide goods and services to its surrounding area—was initially established in 1933 
by Walter Christaller in Die zentralen Orte in Süddeutschland, and later expanded in 1940 as a 
general schema of central place systems in the market area theory developed by August Lösch. In the 
history of human geography, central place theory is one of the classical location theories, and has been 
the subject of research that many geographers attempted to apply with quantitative analysis after the 
Quantitative Revolution. For instance, there are many literatures such as the empirical studies on the 
hierarchical structure of central place systems using multivariate statistical analysis (e.g., Berry and 
Barnum 1962; Beavon 1972), the theoretical studies on the geometric characteristics of systems (e.g., 
Dacey 1965; Arlinghaus 1985), and the mathematical approaches to dynamic model of central places 
(e.g., Allen and Sanglier 1981; Clarke and Wilson 1985). Of mathematical techniques, 
location-allocation models for solving the facility location problem ‘provide a suitable tool for 
operationalizing the concepts of central place theory’ (Beaumont 1987: 21) because of generating 
alternate spatial structure of central place systems by varying different assumptions (Ghosh and 
Rushton 1987).  
Location-allocation model is stated using mathematical programming formulation to seek the 
optimal location subject to constraints such as consumer and producer behaviors. Mathematical 
programming formulation is an effective method for modelling central place theory that founded on 
optimality principle (Beaumont 1982). Attempts to model central place theory using mathematical 
programming include studies, such as those of Henderson (1972), Dökmeci (1973), Puryear (1975), 
and Kohsaka (1983), that have sought to develop analytical models by taking advantage of the 
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frameworks of central place theory, as well as those that have sought to reproduce theoretical central 
place systems, such as those of Storbeck (1988, 1990), Kuby (1989), and Curtin and Church (2007). 
While these studies have incorporated mathematical programming as a means of deriving the 
hierarchical spatial arrangement of central places, their examination of the assumptions and locational 
principles of central place theory is inadequate, and they cannot necessarily be said to have faithfully 
replicated the original central place theory (Ishizaki 1992). If we are to consider the role of central 
place theory as an operational model, then we need to first of all examine the nature of the constraints 
and objectives that Christaller and Lösch imposed on their theory when deriving their central place 
systems (Beaumont 1982: 239). 
However, both Christaller’s and Lösch’s discussion, despite their relatively rigorous discussion 
before deriving the schema of central place system, such as for example in their discussion of supply 
and demand relationship of goods and services, becomes vague when actually locating central places 
or firms and consequently constructing the hierarchical structure. This ambiguity has often led to 
misinterpretations of the theory (e.g., Berry and Garrison 1958a) and has resulted in the faithful 
understandings of the original theory (Saey 1973; Beavon 1977; Morikawa 1980; Hayashi 1986). It is 
necessary to read between the lines in the writings of Christaller and Lösch in order to supplement the 
inherent ambiguity and insufficient explanation in the original central place theory. Whereas their 
theories have previously been forced to rely on descriptive and geometric explanations, today, in an 
era marked by significant advances in the elaboration of mathematical models and computerized 
numerical analysis, I am confident that their reconceptualization from a mathematical modeling 
perspective can provide new insights into central place theory. 
The purpose of this paper is to develop a model that reproduces central place systems using 
mathematical programming and to reinterpret Christaller’s and Lösch’s theories through the process 
of constructing the generalized models. Especially, this paper focuses on modeling of Lösch’s theory 
because Ishizaki (1995) has previously attempted to develop the model of Christaller’s central place 
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theory. Furthermore, after the model of Lösch’s theory is extended, the differences between 
Christaller’s and Lösch’s theories are examined according to an extended model. 
Chapter 2 attempts to model Lösch’s market area theory in the location of single good, and then, 
on the basis of the results of applying the model in a hypothetical area, it is examined whether the 
Lösch’s system can be reproduced according to the operational model of the theory. Although Kuby 
(1989) has already attempted to model Lösch’s market area theory, there appears to be a number of 
problems with its formulation in Kuby (1989) concerning the model’s validity. Hence, after critically 
examining Kuby’s model, the model of Lösch’s theory is reformulated on the basis of reinterpretation 
of the theory. Thereafter, after establishing an objective antithetical to Lösch’s theory, an extension of 
the model concerning the location of single good is developed by unifying the two objectives. 
Chapter 3 discusses the method of constructing a hierarchy in Lösch’s market area theory and 
attempts to model the superimposition problems of hexagonal networks. The hierarchical properties 
of Lösch’s system were intensely debated by Beavon, Marshall, and others in the 1970s (cf. Tarrant 
1973; Beavon and Mabin 1975; Haites 1976; Marshall 1977, 1978a, 1978b; Beavon 1978a, 1978b), 
which resulted in the clarification of a number of things, including a method for faithfully reproducing 
Lösch’s central place systems and the geometrical and mathematical characteristics of hexagonal 
networks. However, there is a problem that has been overlooked in the discussions of these scholars. 
Namely, this problem is concerned with the rationality of Lösch’s central place system from the 
perspective of optimal hierarchical structure. That is, there is no single method for constructing a 
hierarchy by superimposing multiple hexagonal networks of market areas because of the enormous 
possible combinations of central place systems. This rationality of the scheme presented by Lösch can 
be verified by comparing with the solutions of model. Furthermore, this chapter presents the 
reinterpretation concerning the objective of constructing a hierarchy in Lösch’s theory and attempts to 
extend the model considering the agglomeration effect of hierarchical central place systems. 
In Chapter 4, based on the extended model related to the location of single good obtained in 
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Chapter 2 and the extended model of hierarchical structure obtained in Chapter 3, the differences 
between Lösch’s and Christaller’s theories are clarified and both theories are generalized by the 
unified model. Whereas Lösch’s theory is required to make a hexagonal market area network, whose 
size is unique to each good, correspond to that good on the basis of the concept of thresholds, 
Christaller’s central place systems are based on the concept of the range of goods and the successively 
inclusive hierarchy (Schultz 1970), and while both have the same hexagonal structure, the latter 
differs from the former in terms of the locational principle and hierarchical structure. Therefore, this 
chapter attempts to reinterpret the locational principle in Lösch’s and Christaller’s theories on the basis 
of an extended model related to the location of single good, and reveals that it is possible to derive 
Christaller’s central place systems using the extended model of hierarchical structure. On the basis of 
these findings, a generalized model that integrates the location problems of single good and the 
hierarchical structure is proposed using multiobjective programming. I am convinced that there is yet 
no attempt to integrate of both central place theories as viewed from the model structure using 
multiobjective programming. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
Modelling and extending Lösch’s theory in the location 
problems of single good 
 
2.1 The concept of demand cone and the location of firm 
According to Lösch, the equilibrium of locations “is determined by two fundamental tendencies: 
the tendency as seen from the standpoint of the individual firm and hitherto alone considered, to the 
maximization of advantages; and, as seen from the standpoint of the economy as a whole, the 
tendency to maximization of the number of independent economic units” (Lösch 1954: 94). In other 
words, as a result of the free entry of a large number of firms in pursuit of profit, the entry of firms 
ends at the point where normal profit is mutually obtained, creating a state of locational equilibrium. 
At this point, the number of firms that have entered the market is maximized. 
The concept of market area, which is based on demand cones, has been introduced to consider the 
process of locational equilibrium as a spatial perspective. Figure 1 shows a schematic representation 
of demand cones for linear market (Figure 1-a) and two-dimensional market (Figure 1-b). In Figure 1, 
Q represents maximum demand, with demand falling in proportion to the distance of a particular 
good from the firm location, such that demand falls to zero at distance S, which represents the upper 
limit of the range of a good. When a firm is able to monopolize a two-dimensional market, the market 
area of the firm in that market transforms to a circle with a radius S. However, assuming the case 
where a large number of competitors have entered the market, there is a possibility that firms will be 
unable to secure a circular market area with radius S. This is because, in the case that a profit can be 
obtained from a market area even if it overlaps with that of a competitor, a new firm can enter in close 
proximity, resulting in the reduction of the market area. 
The minimum demand necessary in order for firms to remain in business is known as “threshold”   
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(Berry and Garrison 1958b), and where there is a uniform distribution of population and households, 
the threshold can be expressed as the area or volume of the shaded part of Figure 1. Therefore, if a 
firm’s threshold falls below the total demand (i.e., the whole area or whole volume of the demand 
cone in Figure 1), then other firms will be able to establish locations up to the point where a firm is 
able to secure the threshold. 
Figure 2 represents linear market situations in which each firm is able to obtain maximum excess 
profit (Figure 2-a) or only normal profit (Figure 2-b), with the market area for each firm shrinking in  
Figure 1  Concept of demand cone 
7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
the process of shifting from the situation in Figure 2-a to the situation in Figure 2-b. Here, the situation 
in Figure 2-b represents the solution to the locational equilibrium process by Lösch. Assuming an 
infinitely spreading linear market with a uniform population distribution, firms appear at equal 
intervals securing market areas in which they can obtain a normal profit, which achieves the 
maximum number of firms in the market. 
The case of a two-dimensional market is rather more complicated in that market areas overlap 
Figure 2  Löschian locational equilibrium in a linear market 
The right side of a linear market is assumed to extend infinitely. 
8 
 
with one another between the locations of surrounding firms, and because the base of the demand 
cone is cut off, the shape of the market area is polygonal rather than circular. Of all polygons able to 
fill a plane, the regular hexagon is able to obtain the most efficient demand (Lösch 1954: 111), 
therefore, when the distribution of population is uniform, a honeycomb-like market area network 
comprising regular hexagons of identical size that satisfies the threshold is formed. 
 
2.2 Problems with Kuby’s formulation 
Kuby (1989) attempts to model Lösch’s locational equilibrium process by defining the objective 
of maximizing the number of firms while satisfying threshold constraints as an optimization problem. 
This formulation is regarded as a model that reproduces Lösch’s system relatively precisely. However, 
there are several problems with Kuby’s formulation as an operational model of the original central 
place theory. 
First, there is a problem that the optimal solution is not always unique because of the manner in 
which the objective function takes an integer value. In Kuby’s model, while the maximization of the 
number of firms is adopted as an objective function, there is a high possibility for the existence of 
multiple solutions that yield the same value for the objective function. For example, Figure 3 assumes 
a bounded linear market. When firm A and C have already been located as shown in Figure 3, a third 
firm B can be located between the two. However, this market is characterized by the presence of a 
small surplus that produces an excess profit. The demand that corresponds to this surplus will not 
support the establishment of a fourth firm. As a result, this surplus creates a corresponding degree of 
freedom for establishing the location of firm B. Specifically, firm B would be viable regardless of 
whether it was located adjacent to firm A (Figure 3-a) or at a position midway between firm A and C 
(Figure 3-b). Furthermore, there are other potential locations where the demand to secure the 
threshold is obtained. In the case of conditions that produce excess profit as in Figure 3, the above 
objective function will lead to the existence of multiple solutions for a firm’s location even while the  
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maximum number of firms that can enter the market is still only three. 
Of course, while the maximization of the number of firms is one of the objectives of Lösch’s 
market area theory, an important point is that Lösch’s theory assumes maximization not only of the 
number of firms but also of the firm’s profits. Now, when we compare Figure 3-a and Figure 3-b, we 
see that the excess profit that firm B is able to secure is greater in Figure 3-b. Moreover, of all 
Figure 3  Potential solutions of the locational competition by three firms 
in a bounded market 
The legend is the same as Figure 2. 
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potential locations available to firm B, the situation in Figure 3-b, located exactly midway between 
firm A and C, indicates the solution that maximizes excess profit1. In this way, assuming that firms 
will act to maximize their profit and a large number of firms will appear as a result, it is desirable that 
they do so at points where they will be able to obtain higher profits even if the number of firms is the 
same. Kuby’s model lacks the setting of an objective function that reflects this behavior of individual 
firm that leads to the maximization of the number of firms. 
The second problem with Kuby’s formulation is that when the model is applied in reality, the 
allocation of demand to the nearest firm is not guaranteed. Kuby (1989: 332-333) himself confirms 
this as a problem when actually applying the model in a number of hypothetical cases. This is because 
demand has no choice but to be allocated to firms who are not the nearest firms because of the priority 
given to the constraint that each firm satisfies the threshold rather than to the improvement of the 
objective function. Central place theory hypothetically assumes that consumers will use the nearest 
neighboring central place, and when this assumption is not based, the appropriate market area can no 
longer be defined. Accordingly, if we try to build an operational model that is faithful to at least the 
original central place theory, placing demand allocation on the nearest firm or central place represents 
an essential condition. 
The final problem is regarding the condition of equal allocation toward equidistant nodes (this is 
the “indifference principle”). Although Kuby (1989) makes provision for a hypothetical area with a 
demand node arranged on a regular equilateral triangular grid when applying his model, this creates a 
possibility for the existence of multiple nearest firms at equal distances from the demand node. For 
example, when three firms are located at the vertices of an equilateral triangle of a certain size, the 
demand node at the center of the equilateral triangle will be equidistant from each firm. Therefore, 
                                               
1 In Figure 3, the excess profit to be obtained by firm B corresponds to the sum of the area of the 
blank portion of firm B’s market-area. The problem of maximizing the area of blank portion can be 
solved analytically, with the answer being the situation in Figure 3-b located midway between 
adjacent firms. 
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theoretically, it is desirable that one third of the corresponding demand allocation should be allocated 
to each firm. However, when Kuby attempted to formulate the constraints to achieve equal allocation 
to these equidistant points, he defined the nonlinear equation that is impossible to apply the linear 
programming. Therefore, he adopted a linear “symmetry constraint” (Kuby 1989: 327-328) as an 
alternative formulation. The symmetry constraint ensures that several demand nodes equidistant from 
one firm become the same allocation value from that firm. Kuby is himself aware that defining this 
constraint is not appropriate in the formulation of an operational model for central place theory. This is 
because it allows for the occurrence of asymmetrical demand allocation, depending on location 
intervals of adjacent firms. This indifference principle problem, as described below, is critical 
especially when applying the model in regions where populations are not distributed uniformly. 
 
2.3 Reformulation of Lösch’s market area theory 
This section attempts to improve the Kuby’s model and to reformulate Lösch’s market area theory. 
Returning to the first problem with Kuby’s model mentioned above, the reproduction of the locational 
equilibrium process in Lösch’s market area theory would ideally involve the setting of an objective 
function that considers both the maximization of the number of firms as well as the firm’s behavior to 
maximize their profits. Here, the situation in which the maximum number of firms is able to enter the 
market at the same time, as each firm is able to achieve greater profits implies the maximization of 
demand for the entire market. This is because if the total demand is maximized, each firm will on 
average be able to obtain the maximum profit. Taking Figure 3 as an example, this is represented by a 
situation where the total area of the ridge formed by the overlapping of the demand cones for firm A 
through C is maximized (Figure 3-b)2.  
The demand maximization was pointed out as an establishing condition for central place theory 
                                               
2 However, Figure 3 assumes the case whereby the locations of firm A and C are fixed. When we 
hypothesize that the three firms are free to locate where they wish, total demand will be maximized 
when the locations of firm A and C are moved somewhat closer to the middle. 
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by Getis and Getis (1966) and was adopted by Kohsaka (1983) as an objective function when 
modelling the theory. Additionally, in locational competition by commercial establishments such as 
retail chain companies, which aim to increase their market share by developing multiple store 
locations, the maximization of acquisition demand is one of the purposes for which locations are used 
(Goodchild 1984; ReVelle 1986; Hua et al. 2011). Particularly, because it is possible to realize the 
distributed locations of stores and facilities when assuming the distance elasticity of demand 
expressed by the demand cone (Smithies 1941), the goal of demand maximization is also sometimes 
used to model the public facility location that considers accessibility for facility users (Holmes et al 
1972; Calvo and Marks 1973; Wagner and Falkson 1975). Thus, in the sense that it can reflect the 
characteristics of distributed location and the behavior of firms in pursuit of profit, demand 
maximization may be reasonably interpreted as one of the purposes of implementing the ideals of 
central place theory. While Kuby (1989) himself proposes the total demand maximization as a 
potential alternative for the maximization of the number of firms, this is not applied in the actual 
model. Moreover, to my knowledge, there have been no studies that have explicitly modeled Lösch’s 
theory as the total demand maximization problem. Nevertheless, the total demand maximization that 
is premised by the demand cone is able to reproduce Lösch’s locational equilibrium process more 
rationally than the maximization of the number of firms. 
The two remaining problems concerning Kuby’s model, namely the condition of allocating 
demand to the nearest firms and the condition of equal allocation to equidistant points, will need to be 
considered together. First, as for the former, a number of constraints for encouraging the allocation of 
demand to the nearest facilities have been devised in studies that have dealt with the undesirable 
facility location problem and the capacitated facility location problem. However, because the size of 
problems or allocation conditions for equidistant points can differ depending on the constraints used 
(e.g., Gerrard and Church 1996; Espejo et al. 2012), it is also necessary to select appropriate 
constraints depending on the formularization of the problem at hand. On the other hand, regarding the 
13 
 
problem of indifference principle, Gerrard and Church (1996) have demonstrated that it is possible to 
address the condition by adding the constraint of equal allocation to the nearest facility noted by 
Rojeski and ReVelle (1970). However, because this additional constraint is defined by classifying the 
equidistant nodes by case3, the problem tends to be large size and complicated when there are 
multiple equidistant nodes. To my knowledge, there is no generalized formulation for solving the 
indifference principle problem using a linear programming. It might be because, to begin with, the 
existence of more than one equidistant node has never been assumed in facility location problems for 
which the model is to be applied in actual regions, although this also depends on the accuracy when 
measuring distances. However, it is possible to define constraints of equal allocation linearly as 
described below. The constraint proposed for distributing demand to the nearest facility by Wagner 
and Falkson (1975) is adopted because there would be no inconsistency with the indifference 
principle. 
As a result of considering the above problems, the model of Lösch’s theory in the location 
problem of single good is reformulated as a mixed integer programming where the total demand 
maximization is attempted in the following way: 
 
 maxZ = �� 𝑎𝑖𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑋𝑖𝑖
𝑖∈𝑁𝑖𝑖
 (1)  
 
subject to: 
 
� 𝑎𝑖
𝑖∈𝑁𝑗
𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑋𝑖𝑖 ≥ 𝑡𝑌𝑖       ∀ 𝑗 (2)  
                                               
3 For example, in the case of two equidistant nodes, a constraint is added such that the allocation 
value of 0.5, of 0.333 for three nodes, and so on. Thus, constraints are added for dividing the 
allocation value in accordance with the number of equidistant nodes. 
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� 𝑋𝑖𝑖
𝑖∈𝑁𝑖
≤ 1      ∀ 𝑖 (3)  
 𝑌𝑖 − 𝑋𝑖𝑖 ≥ 0      ∀ 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝑖, 𝑗 (4)  
 
� 𝑋𝑖ℎ
ℎ∈𝐹𝑖𝑗
+ 𝑌𝑖 ≤ 1      ∀ 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝑖 (5)  
 𝑋𝑖𝑖 − 𝑋𝑖𝑖 ≤ 2− 𝑌𝑖 − 𝑌𝑖     ∀ 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝑖 ,𝑘 ∈ 𝐸𝑖𝑖 (6)  
 𝑋𝑖𝑖 − 𝑋𝑖𝑖 ≥ 𝑌𝑖 + 𝑌𝑖 − 2     ∀ 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝑖 ,𝑘 ∈ 𝐸𝑖𝑖 (7)  
 𝑋𝑖𝑖 ≥ 0      ∀ 𝑖, 𝑗 (8)  
 𝑌𝑖 = 0,1      ∀ 𝑗 (9)  
 
where: 
ai = population of demand node i; 
 qij = demand quantity from demand node i to potential firm location node j; 
 dij = distance from node i to node j; 
 t = threshold for a firm supplying good ; 
 Xij = fraction of demand at node i that is supplied by a firm at node j; 
1 if a firm locates at node j; 
 Yj =  
  0 otherwise; 
 Ni = the set of nodes j within radius S, that is �𝑗|𝑑𝑖𝑖 ≤ 𝑆�; 
 Nj = the set of nodes i within radius S, that is �𝑖|𝑑𝑖𝑖 ≤ 𝑆�; 
 Fij = the set of potential firm location nodes h farther than node j from node i, that is  
�ℎ|𝑑𝑖𝑖 < 𝑑𝑖ℎ�; 
 Eij = the set of potential firm location nodes k that are equidistant to node j from node i, that  
is �𝑘|𝑑𝑖𝑖 = 𝑑𝑖𝑖 , 𝑘 > 𝑗�. 
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Constraint (2) indicates that each firm satisfies threshold, with threshold t assuming a positive 
value. Constraint (3) prevents a demand node from over-allocating its population, and defines that 
demands at node i are equal to zero if the distance between nodes i and j is beyond the radius S which 
represents the upper limit of the range of a good. Constraint (4) states that demands at node i can only 
be assigned to a firm at node j if a firm is located at node j (this is the “self-assignment constraint”). 
Constraint (5) is the closest assignment constraint introduced by Wagner and Falkson (1975), and 
constraints (6) and (7) guarantee the indifference principle. Specifically, in the case of a firm located at 
node j (i.e., when Yj = 1), all demand allocations from demand node i toward potential firm location 
node h become zero according to constraint (5), indirectly encouraging the allocation of demand to 
the nearest node. Then, by virtue of constraints (6) and (7), in the case that there are firms located at 
nodes j and k, which are equidistant from point i (i.e., when Yj = Yk = 1), equal allocation is realized 
because 𝑋𝑖𝑖 ≤ 𝑋𝑖𝑖 ≤ 𝑋𝑖𝑖  and 𝑋𝑖𝑖 = 𝑋𝑖𝑖  hold true. In the case that there is no or only one firm at 
nodes j and k, then both constraints (4) and (8) represents that either 0 ≤ 𝑋𝑖𝑖 ≤ 1 or 𝑋𝑖𝑖 = 0 
when taking Xij as an example. 
Here, we need to define the amount of demand qij from node i to node j on the basis of the 
concept of demand cone. While Kuby (1989) sets four parameters of the price of good, the 
transportation rate per unit of distance, the slope of the demand curve (distance elasticity), and the 
maximum demand, ultimately we only need consider two parameters of the maximum demand 
without the addition of transportation costs and the elasticity of demand per unit of distance. 
Accordingly, this paper assumes a simple linear relationship between distance and demand4 as 
shown in Figure 1, and defines the quantity of demand as follows: 
 
                                               
4 It is, of course, possible to define a non-linear function, but such a function would still have the 
same properties in the sense that demand decreases monotonically with respect to distance. 
16 
 
 
𝑞𝑖𝑖 = �𝑄 − 𝛽𝑑𝑖𝑖     𝑑𝑖𝑖 ≤ 𝑆 0            𝑑𝑖𝑖 > 𝑆  (10)  
 
where Q represents the maximum demand and β the distance elasticity of demand, with Q > 0 and 
𝛽 ≥ 0. Incidentally, when β is a positive, the theoretical upper limit S of the range of a good can be 
represented as Q/β. 
 
2.4 Setting a hypothetical area 
It is well known that Lösch assumed a hypothetical plain distributed with regular, discrete 
settlements as the space in which firms would be located (Lösch 1954: 114-116). Storbeck (1988, 
1990) and Kuby (1989), who have attempted to model central place theory, have also used uniform 
lattice networks as a hypothetical area for applying the model, attempting to derive a theoretical 
central place system with a central places or firms located at equal intervals. Similarly, this chapter 
sets a hypothetical area consisting of a regular and discrete point distribution.  
However, problems tend to be large size in the model detailed in the previous section, especially 
in constraints (4) through (7), because the number of constraint formulae increases significantly with 
an increase in the number of nodes. This tendency is particularly notable when using a 
two-dimensional market as a hypothetical area. Therefore, this chapter attempts to apply the model 
chiefly to the hypothetical area of a linear market in which problems can be kept comparatively small 
and it remains possible to obtain efficient solutions, and then expands the discussion to a 
two-dimensional market on the basis of the findings obtained. 
The hypothetical area of the linear market used in this chapter, as shown in Figure 4, includes 61 
nodes with integer values of 0 through 60 as coordinate values along the x-axis, regularly distributed 
in a straight line. Each node is simultaneously a demand node and a potential firm location node, and 
the distance between nodes is measured using Euclidean distance. The population ai on the demand  
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node is assumed to be distributed in two patterns, namely uniformly and non-uniformly (Figure 4). In 
the former case, the population for all demand nodes is taken to be 100, while in the latter the 
population is distributed according to Clark’s (1951) model presented below when the market center 
is a node where x coordinate value is 30: 
 
 𝑎𝑖 = 𝑝𝑒−𝑏𝑑𝑖 (11)  
 
where p is a market center population, b is the decline rate of population, and di is the distance from 
the market center to node i. Specifically, p = 200, b = 0.05. Incidentally, the total population of the 61 
demand nodes obtained by Equation (11) is 6,261, which is comparable with the total population of 
6,100 when the population is uniformly distributed. 
The reason for adopting Clark’s model, known as the law of urban population density, is that 
Lösch’s market area theory can be regarded as an alternative theory of tertiary activity on an 
intra-urban scale (Beavon 1977), as well as that examines to validate what the “cobweb-like” 
Figure 4  Hypothetical linear market and uniform and non-uniform 
distributions of population 
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economic landscape (Parr 1973: 192) introduced by Isard (1956: 272) when their population density 
is as low as that of the surrounding area. 
In the development of their theories, both Christaller and Lösch assumed the continuous and 
unbounded plain as a space for the location of their central places. However, we have no choice but to 
apply our model to a finite space of discrete nodes where the number of nodes is limited. The 
application of the model to a finite space produces distortions, especially in the regularity of the 
location of firms near the boundary of hypothetical area (Kuby 1989). Let us examine this problem in 
more detail using Figure 5, which posits a uniform population distribution. 
Figure 5-a represents an example of a hypothetical area closed by boundaries, firm C, who is 
located near the boundary, being unable to obtain demand allocation from outside the area, is only 
able to obtain a smaller quantity of demand compared to firms A and B. Although theoretically the 
three firms locates at regular intervals, if it is estimated that the quantity of demand that firm C can 
acquire is less than threshold, then firm C will not enter the market or will seek elsewhere at a node 
where the threshold can be satisfied. Either way, the change in the demand allocation pattern will 
create an imbalance in acquisition demand for each firm such that the regularity of the location will be 
lost. 
To deal with this boundary problem5, it is necessary to consider how to assume the presence of 
demand allocation outside the region. Kuby (1989) enabled demand allocation from outside the 
region by separating his hypothetical area into an inner area comprising demand nodes and potential 
firm location nodes and an outer area comprising only demand nodes where firms could not be 
located. However, to overcome the above problem, simply setting an outer area is not sufficient. 
For example, Figure 5-b indicates the presence of demand allocation to firm C from demand 
nodes d5 and d6, which are placed in the outer area. Under normal circumstances, the demand  
                                               
5 This problem is similar to so-called “edge effects” in the point pattern analysis (Bailey and Gatrell 
1995: 90). 
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Figure 5  Demand allocation pattern near the boundary 
 
Solid line represents to allocate all population at demand node to firm location and 
dashed line is half allocation. 
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allocation from these two nodes should be shared between firm C and the adjacent firm, as can be 
surmised from firm B’s demand allocation pattern. However, because competing firms cannot be 
located in the outer area, firm C is able to have a monopoly over the demand allocation from the outer 
area. In this way, as the tendency to be located near boundaries with advantageous demand 
acquisition reinforces, this ultimately results in a number of firms different from that predicted by the 
theory and the occurrence of irregularities in the location pattern. 
Kuby’s symmetry constraints mentioned above are also a device for making a demand allocation 
from the outer area equivalent to that from the inner area. However, if nodes d1 through d6 in Figure 
5-b are all equidistant from the location of firm C, this causes problems for the symmetry constraints. 
This is because while it is desirable for nodes d2, d3, d5, and d6 to have symmetrical allocation values 
of 1/2 and all demand from nodes d1 and d4 should be allocated to firm C. Thus, it is possible to 
become different allocation values even if these nodes are equidistant from the same firm. 
Therefore, the following approach to the boundary problem is taken. Namely, “to add virtual 
demand allocation for demand nodes for which there is no point symmetry, when assuming potential 
firm location nodes as centers of symmetry.” Using Figure 5-c as a specific example, now, for node d1, 
node d4 exists in the inner area to provide point symmetry with respect to the location of firm C. 
However, the locations that would provide point symmetry for nodes d2 and d3 correspond to the 
outer area and do not exist in the inner area. Thus, to account for these points d2 and d3, which lack 
point symmetry locations, we will posit the existence of virtual points d2' and d3'. Thereafter, we will 
be able to add the demand allocations to firm C for an equivalent value of the demand allocations 
from nodes d2 and d3. 
In fact, we are now able to deal with constraint (2) above, which relates to the threshold condition, 
as follows: 
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� 𝑎𝑖
𝑖∈𝑁𝑗
𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑋𝑖𝑖 + � 𝑎𝑖
𝑖∈𝑁𝑗∩𝑂𝑗
𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑋𝑖𝑖 ≥ 𝑡𝑌𝑖       ∀ 𝑗 (12)  
 
where Oj is the set of demand nodes i corresponding to the potential firm location node j for which no 
point symmetry locations exist. That is, when point symmetry locations exist, then we include the 
usual demand allocation. When point symmetry locations do not exist, then we include twice the 
usual demand allocation. 
Herein, the condition of point symmetry for demand allocation described above will be referred to 
for the time being as the “mirror effect.” Application of the mirror effect will be limited to the 
threshold condition in constraint (12), and we will not introduce it into the objective function (1) that 
maximizes the total demand. This is because the tendency to be located near boundary areas is 
fostered similar to Figuire 5-b when the demand allocation from outer area is considered as an 
optimization variable. 
 
2.5 Solving the total demand maximization problem 
In applying the model to the linear market in Figure 46, we set the maximum demand Q = 10 and 
the distance elasticity of demand β = 0.8 in Equation (10). Additionally, the upper limit of the range of 
a good is set to S = 10. When β = 1, this is consistent with the theoretical range of a good (Q/β), but in 
that case demand would fall to 0 at a demand node ten units apart from the firm location, and demand 
allocation becomes meaningless. Accordingly, our parameters have been adjusted so that demand 
does not fall to 0 inside the demand cone. 
Figure 6 shows the results of applying the model when t = 8,000 and t = 4,000. From Figure 6-a, 
which has a uniform population distribution and t = 8,000, we find seven firms located at equal  
                                               
6 In this paper, all problems are solved using NUOPT ver.15.1.0 by NTT DATA Mathematical 
Systems Inc. 
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intervals. The total demand quantity of each firm is exactly 8,000 that is sum of demand at nodes 
within a radius of four units from each firm location and demand at nodes divided into two among 
adjacent firms. Accordingly, when each firm is located next to another while maintaining a market 
area with a radius of five units, the number of firms able to enter the market and the total demand of 
the entire market is maximized with each firm able to obtain only a normal profit. In Figure 6-a, while 
there are firms located at both ends of the linear market at the x-coordinates 0 and 60, these firms are 
unable to meet the threshold using only demand from within the market. However, by employing the 
Figure 6  Solutions of the total demand maximization problem 
in a linear market 
 
Shaded area corresponds to the quantity of threshold. Demand cones are omitted in b) 
and d). 
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mirror effect from constraint (12), these firms will be able to secure the threshold by accepting 
demand allocation from a virtual outer area. 
Even though the population distribution is uniform, it remains somewhat lacking in regularity for t 
= 4,000 (Figure 6-b). This is because, under the values we set earlier for the maximum demand Q = 
10 and the distance elasticity of demand β = 0.8, there will be no solution that would be exactly equal 
to 4,000 for each firm, which results in the production of excess profit, leading the market area to 
become asymmetrical7. If we assume a discrete point distribution, then this presents us with a 
problem that we will have to somehow overcome. 
This asymmetry of market area also arises in the event of a non-uniform population distribution. 
Figure 6-c shows the results of the case where threshold is set to 8,000 for a non-uniform population 
distribution. When this is compared against a case with a uniform population distribution (Figure 6-a), 
we see that the market area size varies significantly depending on location, producing asymmetry. In 
other words, while it is possible to meet the threshold within a comparatively confined market area in 
the vicinity of market centers with dense populations, a much wider market area is needed to acquire 
the demand satisfied the threshold in areas with a sparse population distribution. Because the breadth 
of distance between firm locations is determined in response to population distribution, drawing 
boundaries between market areas for adjacent firms in a linear market could cause the development of 
market areas characterized by left–right asymmetry. This tendency will be similar in the case where 
threshold is set to 4,000 for a non-uniform population distribution (Figure 6-d). As stated above, using 
the symmetry constraint used by Kuby (1989) implies that nodes that are equidistant from a firm 
location have the same demand allocation value, thus preventing the emergence of the asymmetric 
market areas. 
From Figure 6-c, we see that in addition to excess profits occurring for firms in the vicinity of 
                                               
7 Specifically, the solutions that yield values closest to 4,000 are 3,680 and 4,100. In the latter case, 
which satisfies the threshold, the allocation value takes a left–right asymmetry at demand nodes at 
a radius of two units from the firm location. 
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market centers, there are also demand nodes not included in the demand cones toward both edges of 
the market. The former is the effect of a discrete point distribution. If the market were a continuous 
space, firms would likely be located even more closely together. The latter is the result of the coverage 
condition of a good as shown in constraint (3). As opposed to Christaller’s central place theory, which 
covers all demand nodes inside the upper limit of the range of a good (that is “mandatory coverage”), 
Lösch’s market area theory prioritizes firm’s acquisition of profit. As a result, it is possible that 
uncovered area will appear in areas with low demand. 
Application of the model to a non-uniform population distribution is similar to the case wherein 
density conversion is employed for deforming the hexagonal networks of central places in response to 
demand allocation; cartograms (Getis 1963) and map transformation techniques (Rushton 1972; 
Sugiura 1991) are a few such examples. Then, imagining a situation where we rotate the linear 
market, expanding it as a two-dimensional market, we can infer the bias pattern of market area 
networks in the case of non-uniform population distribution of Isard (1956). 
Although there is a risk of large size problems occurring when the model is applied to a 
two-dimensional market, let us examine below the possibility of applying the model using a relatively 
small size two-dimensional market as a hypothetical area. The hypothetical area is a discrete space of 
127 demand nodes and 43 potential firm location nodes on a regular equilateral triangular grid as 
shown in Figure 7. Note that not all demand nodes are potential firm location nodes for the following 
two reasons: (1) to reduce the size of the problem and (2) to consider the influence of blank areas 
where there is no demand between nodes8.  
When applying the model, because the nearest distance between nodes in Figure 7 is four units  
                                               
8 When assuming a discrete point distribution, the fact that there is a possibility of “gaps” occurring 
in the supply of a good between nodes implies that our hypothetical area would not fulfill its role as 
a continuous virtual plane. I have addressed this problem by placing demand nodes separately from 
potential firm location nodes. For a closer discussion, see Ishizaki (1992). Note that there are some 
cases in which it is possible to examine central place systems when uncovered areas occur (Church 
and Bell 1990). 
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Figure 7  Solutions of the total demand maximization problem 
in a plane market 
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and considering the number of nodes, the following parameters have been set. Namely, the maximum 
demand Q = 10, the distance elasticity of demand β = 0.5, and the upper limit of the range of a good S 
= 16. As with the linear market, the population distribution is such that all nodes have a population of 
100 in uniform distributions, while the non-uniform distributions of population have been calculated 
on the basis of Equation (11). Specifically, setting one node where x- and y-coordinate values are 30 
in Figure 7 as market center, the parameters for Equation (11) have been set to p = 300 and b = 0.08. 
As a result, the aggregate population for 127 demand nodes is 12,013, which is approximately the 
equivalent of a population of 12,700 in the uniform population distribution case. In addition, to 
facilitate the comparison of the model’s results for different population distributions and threshold 
conditions, the constraint that at least one firm must be located in a market center has been added to 
the model. 
Figures 7-a through c represent the results of applying the model for uniform populations with 
respective thresholds of t = 16,000, t = 14,000, and t = 6,000, while Figure 7-d shows the result for a 
non-uniform population with a threshold of t = 5,000. Summarizing the findings obtained from these 
results, we can confirm the following among other things: (1) as Beavon (1977) has summarized for 
Lösch’s theory for uniform population distributions, regular hexagonal networks of various sizes are 
formed because the number of demand nodes included in a market area is different according to the 
threshold value, and that (2) as indicated by Isard (1956), for non-uniform population distributions, 
market area networks emerge in which the hexagonal structure is distorted. 
As can be seen by comparing Figure 7-a and Figure 7-b, the derivation of market area networks 
of different sizes, even for the same number of firms, is the result of the fact that an objective function 
of the model is not the maximization of the number of firms but the maximization of total demand. In 
addition, the mirror effect in Equation (12) and the condition of the equal allocation of demand in 
constraints (6) and (7) result in the realization of a pattern whereby firms are located at regular 
intervals while securing a minimum market area that yields normal profit. Furthermore, in the case of 
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a non-uniform population distribution, we can see that it corresponds to the formation of more 
realistic (if more complex) market area networks, as in the case of nodes allocated equally to four 
equidistant firms. 
From the above, we may regard the model demonstrated in this chapter as a model that reliably 
reproduces the locational principle and preconditions in Lösch’s market area theory. Moreover, this 
model will be considered as an operational model that enables the derivations of theoretical location 
patterns even under various real-world conditions. 
 
2.6 Developing the total profit maximization problem 
As described above, in Lösch’s market area theory, which considers locational equilibrium to be 
the result of perfect competition and free entry of firms into the market, the firm will be unable to 
obtain anything other than normal profit. However, in reality, according to the changes of population 
distribution, prices, and production costs in the market, it is possible that excess profits will begin to 
accrue after locating firms once or that a firm will only be able to achieve demand that falls below the 
threshold. To begin with, the situation where no firm is able to obtain excess profit is extremely 
unrealistic. Conversely, what would be the most profitable situation for a firm? This would be when a 
firm is able to secure all excess profits included in the market area of radius S within the demand cone 
shown in Figure 1. 
Figure 2-a represents a situation in which firms A and B participate while securing maximum 
profit. If we assume this linear market to extend infinitely, then each firm will not only locate without 
overlapping a market area of radius S, but also will ensure that all demands are captured in the market. 
In contrast to “the total demand maximization problem”, in which each firm is located as close to one 
another as possible on the condition that a normal profit can be obtained, this can be considered as 
“the total profit maximization problem” (Hansen and Thisse 1977). In this case, all firms participating 
in the market are able to obtain maximum excess profit. 
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In the example given in Figure 2-a, the total profit is represented by the total area of blank parts. In 
other words, it is simply the total area that is obtained by subtracting the total area of shaded parts as 
two firm’s thresholds from the total area under the ridge as the total demand. Accordingly, the total 
profit maximization problem can be formulated by correcting the objective function (1) to the 
following equation and by using constraints (2) through (9) without modifying them:  
 
 maxZ = �� 𝑎𝑖𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑋𝑖𝑖
𝑖∈𝑁𝑖𝑖
−�𝑡𝑌𝑖
𝑖
 (13)  
  
Here, let us apply the total profit maximization problem to the linear market of the hypothetical 
area in Figure 4. Our parameters, just as with Figure 6, will be maximum demand Q = 10, distance 
elasticity of demand β = 0.8, and the upper limit of the range of a good S = 10. Additionally, the 
mirror effect is applied by using constraint (12) instead of constraint (2). Figures 8-a and 8-b represent 
the results of applying the model to uniform populations with respective thresholds of t = 8,000 and t 
= 4,000, while Figure 8-c shows the result for a non-uniform population with a threshold of t = 8,000. 
From Figure 8-a, we find that each firm has a monopoly over a distance of ten units that 
represents the maximum radius of the demand cone, with three firms participating in the market 
located at equal intervals. Hence, under normal circumstances, maximum excess profit will be 
obtained for each firm when they are located without any overlap in the demand cone. However, 
when threshold is set to 4,000, by increasing the number of firms participating in the market, the 
interval between firm locations is narrowed, necessarily leading to a subdivision of the market area 
(Figure 8-b). 
Given infinite space, the fourth firm would enter outside area, as shown in Figure 8-a, and each 
firm would be able to earn even greater excess profit without any mutual market area interference. 
However, even considering the mirror effect expressed in constraint (12) into account, the linear  
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market of our hypothetical area is not infinite. Accordingly, insofar as we are considering a finite 
space, the addition of a firm inside a limited market as in Figure 8-b can sometimes lead to the 
occurrence of a rise in total overall profits depending on threshold values. 
In addition, even in the case of a non-uniform population distribution, demand cone overlap can 
still be confirmed (Figure 8-c). This is because firms intend to be located in a densely populated area 
that is more advantageous for earning profit than the surrounding area with little prospective demand. 
As a result, even if the market areas of radius S are partially overlapped between firms, the total profit 
is maximized in the entire market. Therefore, in the case of a non-uniform population distribution, 
Figure 8  Solutions of the total profit maximization problem 
in a linear market 
The legend is the same as Figure 6. 
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there is a conceivable possibility that demand cones will overlap regardless of whether the space is 
finite or infinite. 
In contrast to the total demand maximization problem (Figure 6) which seeks to maximize the 
number of firms, there are fewer firm locations in the total profit maximization problem. The total 
profit maximization problem represents an antithetical model in the sense that it supplies a good by 
having as few locations as possible. 
 
2.7 Extension of the model using multiobjective programming 
If Lösch’s market area theory is regarded as the total demand maximization problem on the 
unrealistic assumption of perfect and free competition, then we will be forced to admit that the total 
profit maximization problem is also unrealistic in the same way. This is because it is difficult to 
imagine that firms will make efforts together with one another to secure maximum excess profit 
without encroaching on each other’s areas, as shown in Figure 2-a. A situation such as the one shown 
in Figure 2-a is limited to an extreme case, for example, when a market is monopolized by only one 
company (Ghosh and Harche 1993). 
A solution between the two extremes of the total demand maximization and the total profit 
maximization is realistically conceivable. In other words, a situation in which a certain degree of 
excess profit is to be expected is plausible. The method for simultaneously optimizing such multiple 
and competing objectives is known as multiobjective programming (Cohon 1978). Multiobjective 
programming typically involves the use of a weighting method that combines multiple objective 
functions by applying a weighting to each individual objective and then adjusting the weighting 
minutely to derive several eclectic non-inferior solutions (Pareto optimal solutions). 
Therefore, the extended model in which two objectives are integrated can be formulated as 
follows using multiobjective programming by substituting Z1 for the right-hand side of objective 
function (1), which represents the total demand, and Z2 for the right-hand side of objective function 
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(13), which represents the total profit: 
 
 maxZ = (1 −𝑤)𝑍1 + 𝑤𝑍2 (14)  
  
where w is a weight that takes a value of 0 ≤ 𝑤 ≤ 1. Namely, when w = 0, the objective function 
(14) represents the total demand maximization problem, and when w = 1 it equivalent to the total 
profit maximization problem. Moreover, because eclectic solutions for both can be obtained when 0 < 𝑤 < 1. 
Here, let us apply the extended model to the hypothetical area in Figure 4. To avoid complication, 
we will demonstrate only the solution for a uniform population distribution where threshold t = 8,000. 
Note that our parameters will be as they have been thus far, with maximum demand Q = 10, distance 
elasticity of demand β = 0.8, and the upper limit of the range of a good S = 10. In addition, the 
constraints will be according to constraints (3) through (9), with the mirror effect applied by adopting 
constraint (12). Weighting w is varied in increments of 0.01. 
Table 1 lists five non-inferior solutions obtained by changing the weighting w. Of these solutions, 
Solution A corresponds to the solution to the total demand maximization problem (Figure 6-a), 
whereas Solution E corresponds to a solution for the total profit maximization problem (Figure 8-a). 
Among the objective functions, there will be cases when total profit takes a negative value, because 
while extrinsic demand will be added to the threshold condition by the mirror effect of constraint (12), 
the demand in question will not be reflected in the objective function. Accordingly, a negative total 
profit does not necessarily mean that the threshold is not satisfied. 
By observing the transition of the two objective function values in Table 1, we can see that there is 
a trade-off relationship between the two objectives. In multiobjective programming, an absolutely 
optimal solution that is simultaneously optimal for multiple objectives generally does not exist. Hence, 
on the basis of the variations in each objective function value, we turn to weigh the compromise  
32 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
alternative of our non-inferior solutions. Accordingly, rather than leading us to a unique optimal 
solution, multiobjective programming offers a richly flexible model in the sense that it seeks out 
solutions interactively from among many competing objectives. 
Of five non-inferior solutions in Table 1, Figure 9 shows the results of Solution C situated middle 
solution between the two objectives of total demand maximization and total profit maximization. All 
five solutions show a trend for forms to be located at equal intervals, and solution C is no exception. 
Total demand (Z 1) Total profit (Z 2)
A 0.00～0.04 49,000 -7,000 7
B 0.05～0.30 48,600 600 6
C 0.31～0.46 46,120 6,120 5
D 0.47～0.78 42,440 10,440 4
E 0.79～1.00 36,200 12,200 3
Solution w
Objectives Number of
firms
Table 1  Non-inferior solutions of the extended model 
for single good 
Figure 9  Locational pattern of non-inferior Solution C in Table 1 
The legend is the same as Figure 6. 
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We might go so far as to say that the results shown in Figure 9, which are similar to neither Figure 6-a 
nor Figure 8-a, illustrate the situation whereby each firm is able to earn moderate excess profit. 
Ultimately, the differences between five non-inferior solutions depend on the number of 
established firms. The weight w of objective functions in multiobjective programming is a relative 
indicator for deriving multiple non-inferior solutions, and the value of the weighting itself does not 
necessarily have any meaning. Although each of non-inferior solutions shown in Table 1 appears for a 
certain range of values of weight w, the objective function values Z1 and Z2 remain constant within 
that range. In other words, the model represented by objective function (14) may be thought of as a 
model that variably captures the number of firm locations while extending Lösch’s model ultimately 
to the maximum number of firms entering into the market. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
Modelling and extending Lösch’s theory in hierarchical 
structures 
 
3.1 Lösch’s outline of constructing a hierarchy 
In Lösch’s market area theory, a two-dimensional market with a uniform population distribution 
takes shape as a market area of regular hexagons of varying sizes according to the threshold of each 
good. For a continuous plain, the fact that firms can be freely located on the plain implies that 
innumerable market area networks can exist at slightly varying intervals. Hence, Lösch fixed the 
places where firms can be located by assuming a plain on which the settlements that indicate demand 
nodes and potential firm locations are distributed regularly and discretely in a lattice network of 
regular equilateral triangles. As a result, the location interval between firms is defined in the 
distribution of the settlements, and conceptually possible market area networks are limited to a finite 
number. Accordingly, market area networks is determined in consideration of regular hexagonal 
market areas of varying sizes that regard two arbitrary settlements as the neighboring market centers. 
Specifically, Lösch examined the case where the distance between market centers gradually 
increases, assuming as for the start from the market area network in which the distance between 
market centers is √3𝑎, when distance between adjacent settlements is assumed to be a. As in Figure 
10, when the distance from market center O to P1 is taken as √3𝑎, the six settlements that serve as 
the nearest market centers for O, including P1, will be distributed along a circle of radius √3𝑎 
centered on O. The boundaries delimited between these nearest market centers represent the market 
area for O and yield the shape of a regular hexagon. Assigning the area Number 1 to this smallest 
market area A1, market area A2, with the next-largest distance between market centers, will be the 
market area delimited between six settlements along a circle of radius 2a from O to P2. In this way,  
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starting with O as the reference point, and following the distance from O to any settlement in 
ascending order, and then defining the boundary between the settlements along a circle with a radius 
of the distance in question, it will be possible to derive market areas of various sizes. 
However, the settlements on the circumference of the circle will not necessarily be six. For 
Figure 10  Derivation of the market areas of various sizes 
 
  Solid lines and dashed lines represent the boundaries of market areas assigned the 
market area number. The radius of circles from O is each segment OP1, OP2, and OP3. 
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example, in market area A3, for which the distance between market centers is √7𝑎, there are twelve 
settlements that exist along the circle of radius √7𝑎 and centered on O (Figure 10). As a result, there 
could be two alternatives, in the hexagonal market area described by the boundary between O and P3 
and the market area described by the boundary between O and P4. When there are only six nearest 
market centers, as in market areas A1 and A2, there can be only one market area network, but when 
there are twelve or more nearest market centers, as in market area A3, then there will be multiple 
market area networks of identical size. 
Lösch’s hierarchical arrangement is able to represent market area networks of different sizes as a 
problem of superimposition, as shown in Figure 11. Lösch assumed that all of the market area 
networks “shall have at least one center in common” (Lösch 1954: 124), and he regarded this 
common center as a metropolis. Then, using the metropolis as a reference point, he created market 
area networks of varying sizes and overlaid the networks in ascending order from the smallest market 
area network. On the basis of the size of the market area that satisfies the threshold, each good can be 
associated with a single market area network9. Figure 11 illustrates the relation between three goods 
and three kinds of market area networks. Whereas the market area network corresponding to goods 
Numbers 1 and 2 is uniquely determined, because there are two alternative identically sized market 
area networks corresponding to good Number 3, it will be necessary to select one of them. 
The difference between alternatives, as shown in market area A3 for Figure 10, is the difference in 
the angle of the sides of the regular hexagonal market area. That is, what differs is the direction of the 
nearest market center, as seen from the metropolis. Lösch, when selecting one from among multiple 
alternatives, considered an array of market area networks, noting “we turn the nets about this center in 
such a way as to get six sectors with many and six with only a few production sites” (Lösch 1954: 
124). The production site indicates a supply point for good or a firm location and corresponds to a  
                                               
9 However, as in Figure 11, the number of goods associated with a market area network is not 
necessarily one. In fact, it could be that “one and the same area will usually be the market for 
several goods, since there are more products than regional sizes” (Lösch 1954: 122). 
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market center on the market area selected from alternatives. Thus, as a result of selecting the market 
area network corresponding to each good on the basic principle of concentrating supply points in a 
specific zone, a central place system is derived in which there is an alternate appearance of “city-rich 
sectors” and “city-poor sectors.” 
Figure 11  Superimposition of market area networks of the Lösch’s system 
A right-side figure is a serial number of the market area networks. 
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3.2 Combinational problem of the superimposition of market area networks 
What becomes problematic about the hierarchical arrangement in Lösch’s market area theory is 
the method of selecting one market area network from multiple alternatives. Beavon (1977: 89-92), 
after arranging market areas of various sizes, has produced a table listing 150-center market area 
illustrated by Lösch (1954: 127). While this table lists market area numbers and the number of 
settlements included in one market area, it does not specify which market areas have alternatives, or 
how many alternatives there are. Thus, by referring to the table provided by Beavon (1977: 92), Table 
2 adds the distances between market centers for each market area and the number of alternatives. 
However, to avoid redundancy, to the discussion is limited to the fifty-five market area networks 
illustrated by Lösch (1954: 128). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Area
no. n d a
Area
no. n d a
Area
no. n d a
1 3 1.73 1 20 52 7.21 2 39 111 10.54 2
2 4 2.00 1 21 57 7.55 2 40 112 10.58 2
3 7 2.65 2 22 61 7.81 2 41 117 10.82 2
4 9 3.00 1 23 63 7.94 2 42 121 11.00 1
5 12 3.46 1 24 64 8.00 1 43 124 11.14 2
6 13 3.61 2 25 67 8.19 2 44 127 11.27 2
7 16 4.00 1 26 73 8.54 2 45 129 11.36 2
8 19 4.36 2 27 75 8.66 1 46 133 11.53 4
9 21 4.58 2 28 76 8.72 2 47 139 11.79 2
10 25 5.00 1 29 79 8.89 2 48 144 12.00 1
11 27 5.20 1 30 81 9.00 1 49 147 12.12 3
12 28 5.29 2 31 84 9.17 2 50 148 12.17 2
13 31 5.57 2 32 91 9.54 4 51 151 12.29 2
14 36 6.00 1 33 93 9.64 2 52 156 12.49 2
15 37 6.08 2 34 97 9.85 2 53 157 12.53 2
16 39 6.24 2 35 100 10.00 1 54 163 12.77 2
17 43 6.56 2 36 103 10.15 2 55 169 13.00 3
18 48 6.93 1 37 108 10.39 1
19 49 7.00 3 38 109 10.44 2
Table 2  List of fifty-five market area networks 
Note: n is the number of settlements included in a single market, d is the distance 
between market centers, and a represents the number of alternatives. 
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Lösch (1954: 117) has previously referred to how the square of the distance between market 
centers corresponds to the number of settlements included in one market area when the distance 
between settlements a = 1. Further, depending on the value for the number of settlements, we can 
determine whether or not a market area will have alternatives (Marshall 1977). In fact, as previously 
described, the number of alternatives can be determined by measuring the distance from the 
settlement that serves as a reference point to any other settlement, and then counting the number of 
settlements distributed along a circle with the respective radiance around the metropolis and then 
dividing that number by six. Looking at Table 2, we find that within fifty-five market area networks, 
thirty-nine networks have multiple alternatives, and the maximum number of alternatives is four. 
Thus, the number of market area networks that should be selected from among alternatives is more 
than the number of networks uniquely determined. This tendency becomes even more prominent 
when the number of types of market area is increased.10  
Table 2 demonstrates the fact that when all market area networks are superimposed, there will be 
innumerable combinations of which only one will be selected from alternatives. For example, in 
fifty-five market-area networks shown in Table 2, there are thirty-four market area networks with two 
alternatives, three with three alternatives, and two with four alternatives. As a result, the alternatives 
can be combined in 234 × 33 × 42—that is, about 7.4 trillion—different ways. If the number of market 
area networks to be considered increases further, the number of combinations will reach astronomical 
figures because the combinatorial explosion occurs11. The results of the superimposition of market 
area networks illustrated by Lösch are thus only one of the myriad numbers of such combinations. 
Although the combination described above represents a number that conforms to Lösch’s 
provision “to have at least one center in common”, what might happen when this precondition is 
relaxed? Lösch’s hierarchical arrangement has a reputation of being more flexible than Christaller’s 
                                               
10 While the number and percentage of market area networks with alternatives is 39 for 55 types 
(70.9%), for 150 types it becomes 123 (82.0%), and 932 (93.2%) for 1,000 types. 
11 For example, the number of combinations for 150 market area networks is 5.95358 × 1042 ways! 
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central place theory (Dicken and Lloyd 1990: 35) because it offers a high degree of freedom as 
congruence of every market center is not required. In this sense, the presence of a metropolis that 
assimilates all market centers would be exceptional, and there is no imperative to recognize such 
exceptions. When the metropolis is not fixed as a reference point, a wider variety of superimposition 
patterns can be considered (Matsubara 2013: 46-47). 
Not having a fixed reference point means that when we align market area networks with the 
distribution of settlements, we are able to arrange market centers offset from the metropolis. 
Specifically, let me explain using Figure 12 with reference to the example of market area Number 1 in 
Table 2. Figure 12-a shows the boundary of market area and the adjacent market centers, when a 
market center and the point A as a metropolis match each other. Now, how many conceivable patterns 
could be obtained by moving the market centers away from the point A and then drawing a different 
pattern than that of the market area network in Figure 12-a? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12  Market area network obtained by moving the market center to 
another point from a metropolis 
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Given that other market centers also move in tandem as a market center moves from the point A, 
the range of movement for a market center on the point A may be limited to be within the market area 
of the point A. In the example of Figure 12, the six settlements around the point A will serve as our 
movement point candidates. However, the market area networks that can be obtained when one 
actually moves from the point A, excluding the same patterns, converge to the two patterns shown in 
Figure 12-b and Figure 12-c. That said, when we move from the point A to the point B (Figure 12-b), 
two points other than the point B from among the above-mentioned six movement point candidates 
become market centers, and it is no longer necessary to consider these as point candidates. The same 
can be said to hold true when moving from the point A to the point C (Figure 12-c). In other words, 
we are able to form three distinct market area networks for market area Number 1, including one case 
where a market center is matched with the point A.  
Considering other market area numbers in the same way, we find that the number of patterns of 
market area networks, including those that do not fix a market center to the metropolis, is equivalent 
to the number of settlements for each market area network in Table 2. In the case of market areas with 
alternatives, the existence of market area network patterns with different numbers of settlements for 
each alternative means that, in the end, the number of possible patterns is equal to the product of the 
number of settlements and the number of alternatives. In other words, this leaves us with three 
patterns for market area Number 1, four for market area Number 2, and fourteen for market area 
Number 3. Accordingly, when we perform a simple trial calculation of the combination of 
superimposition problems for market area networks, only ten kinds of market area networks still 
leave us with over 300 billion possible patterns. 
The precondition, “to have at least one center in common,” might have been set by Lösch because 
it was impossible to examine such enormous number of combinatorial problems. However, even 
when we fix a market center to the metropolis for the sake of argument, there is no change in the 
existence of a large combination number when overlaying market area networks. Our problem, then, 
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is how Lösch arrived at one pattern from among these many combinations. 
 
3.3 The superimposition problem as a combinatorial optimization 
When selecting a market area network with multiple alternatives, Beavon and Mabin (1975), who 
faithfully reproduced Lösch’s process of constructing a hierarchy, have demonstrated that the pattern 
illustrated by Lösch can be obtained by the following three steps: 1) align the nearest market center as 
seen from the metropolis with specific sectors (Dacey 1965: 121), 2) when there are multiple 
alternatives for the location of a market center within specific sectors, choose the alternative that 
maximizes the number of coincident market centers, and 3) on such occasions, select a market center 
with comparatively higher-order goods from among points when there is an identical number of 
goods. 
Of these, Step 1) is a condition that prioritizes locating market centers in particular sectors 
involved in the creation of “city-rich sectors”, and Step 2) is a condition that maximizes the number of 
coincident market centers. The other condition 3) is a secondary condition associated with 2), and in 
the 150 market area networks examined by Beavon and Mabin (1975), this condition is applied to 
only two types of market areas A85 and A150. Tarrant (1973) and Marshall (1977) have also mentioned 
the two conditions of prioritizing location in particular sectors and maximizing the number of 
coincident market centers, and Marshall’s (1977) opinion differs from Beavon and Mabin (1975) 
because of preceding the latter condition (Hayashi 1986: 200). 
The problem of seeking out the most desirable solution from among a finite combination number 
in light of a certain purpose is known as the combinatorial optimization (Korte and Vygen 2008). 
Lösch’s process of constructing a hierarchy to derive a pattern from the superimposition of multiple 
market area networks can be defined as a combinatorial optimization. Here, this section attempts to 
model the problem of superimposing market area networks using mathematical programming. 
Assuming that Lösch would regard a sectoral pattern as the best spatial solution to the arrangement of 
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market area networks (Dicken and Lloyd 1990: 31), the prioritization of locating market centers in 
particular sectors becomes the criteria for optimization among the steps listed by Beavon and Mabin 
(1975). However, because there are cases where there is no determinate solution solely for prioritizing 
location in particular sectors, when we define the problem by adding the maximization of the number 
of coincident market centers from Step 2) in the above list, then the problem of superimposing market 
area networks can be formulated as an integer programming problem using multiobjective 
programming as follows: 
 
 maxZ = 𝑤��𝑌𝑖𝑗
𝑗
+ (1− 𝑤)���𝑌𝑖𝑗 − 𝐹𝑖
𝑗
�
𝑖𝑖∈𝑆
 (15)  
   
subject to: 
 
� X𝑗𝑖
𝑖∈𝑁𝑚
= 1   ∀ 𝑚 (16)  
 
� 𝑎𝑖𝑖X𝑗𝑖
𝑖∈𝑁𝑚
= 𝑌𝑖𝑗     ∀ 𝑗,𝑚 (17)  
 𝐹𝑖 − 𝑌𝑖𝑗 ≥ 0   ∀ 𝑗,𝑚 (18)  
 𝑋𝑗𝑖 = 0,1     ∀ 𝑚, 𝑖 (19)  
 𝑌𝑖𝑗 = 0,1     ∀ 𝑗,𝑚 (20)  
 𝐹𝑖 = 0,1     ∀ 𝑗 (21)  
 
where: 
1 if node j is predefined as the center of market area network i; 
 aij =  
  0 otherwise; 
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1 if good m is corresponding to the market area network i; 
 Xmi =  
  0 otherwise; 
 
1 if node j is selected to the market center of good m; 
 Yjm =  
  0 otherwise; 
 
1 if node j becomes the market center of one or more goods; 
 Fj =  
  0 otherwise; 
 S = the set of nodes j within particular sectors; 
Nm = the set of market area networks i that can correspond to good m. 
 
This model is applied to the discrete lattice network of regular equilateral triangles where the 
center of each market area is predefined according to Figure 10. The market area network i is a serial 
number in which all alternatives were counted. Using Figure 11 as an example, the total number of 
market area networks is four because there are two alternatives in the market area Number 3. 
Therefore, the sets of market area networks of goods Numbers 1 and 2 that correspond to only one 
market area network are N1 = {1} and N2 = {2}, and the set of market area networks of good Number 
3 with alternatives is N3 = {3, 4}.  
As for the objective function (15), the first term on the right side expresses the objective of 
maximizing the total number of market centers included in particular sectors, while the second term 
represents the objective of maximizing the coincidence of market centers. The value in parentheses in 
the second term is a difference between the number of goods at node j and Fj, and Fj substantially 
indicates the location of central place. Specifically, the number of coincident market centers would be 
2 in the case that the number of goods at node j was 3, and 0 if the number of goods was only 1 or if 
node j is not a central place. In other words, this means that the higher the value, the more market 
centers there are that coincide at node j. The two objectives are combined using a weighting method 
within multiobjective programming. Weight w, which adjusts the level of priority given between the 
objectives, takes a value 0 < 𝑤 < 1, and when applying the solution in practice, minutely adjusting 
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this weight w allows us to derive a number of eclectic non-inferior solutions. 
Constraint (16) represents that either of market area network of good m from among the set Nm. 
Constraint (17) determines whether or not node j is the market center of good m, while constraint (18) 
defines the value of central place location Fj. In the objective function (15), because the endogenous 
variable Fj is minimized, Fj automatically becomes 0 when 𝐹𝑖 ≥ 0 is always satisfied. 
 
3.4 Comparing the Lösch’s system with the solution of model 
Let us actually apply the model defined in previous section to the superimposition problem for the 
150 market area networks presented by Lösch. If the distance between settlements is taken to be a, the 
distance between market centers in market area Number 150 is √511𝑎. Therefore, the subject area 
is set within a circle of radius √511𝑎 from the metropolis on a triangular lattice network to which 
nodes are distributed at intervals of distance a, and there are 1,867 nodes in the subject area. When the 
range of a 30° arc from the y-axis in clockwise with the origin as a metropolis is defined as a 
particular sector, the set of nodes S contains 138 nodes12. The total number of alternatives for 150 
market area networks yields 310 options. Therefore, the superimposition problem for market area 
networks can be defined as the problem where correspondences between 310 market area networks i 
and 150 types of goods m are to be found.  
Here, if we apply the model to the subject area outlined above by varying the value of weight w in 
the objective function (15) from 0.01 to 0.99 by an increment of 0.01, two non-inferior solutions are 
derived. With one solution, the first term of the objective function yields the value of 317 and the 
second term yields 2,525, while another solution gives the value of 314 for the first term and 2,543 for 
the second term. Compared with the central place system of Lösch, restored by Beavon and Mabin 
(1975), that consists of 150 market area networks, among the results of applying the model, the latter 
                                               
12 Nodes located on the boundary line with adjacent sectors are not included in the set of particular 
sectors S. 
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solution yields the same value for the second term of the objective function as its counterpart in Lösch. 
Therefore, in what follows, let us compare the latter solution with Lösch’s system by focusing on the 
prioritizing location in particular sectors out of the two objectives as our optimization criteria. 
Figure 13 represents a portion of the subject area obtained by taking the metropolis as an origin 
and cutting a 60° arc clockwise from the y-axis. As indicated by Beavon and Mabin (1975: 146), in 
the diagram of a central place system presented by Lösch (1954: 127), the configuration of a range 
consisting of a circle of radius√511𝑎 and of a partially different area (the range of the dashed lines 
in Figure 13) produces excess or deficiency in some of the numbered market areas in the 150 market 
area networks. Here, because we want to compare all combinations of the 150 market area networks, 
in the same manner as Beavon and Mabin (1975), let us use the range of a circle of radius √511𝑎. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13  Central place systems of one hundred fifty market area 
networks 
 
Dashed lines represent the boundaries of one hundred fifty market areas by Lösch. 
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From Figure 13, we see that the large numbers of goods are concentrated within the Sector A, a 
particular sector of Figure 13, both in the results of Lösch’s system (Figure 13-a) and the solution of 
model (Figure 13-b). This Sector A is a “city-rich sector” within Lösch’s central place system, while 
Sector B is a “city-poor sector.” However, when we observe in detail, slight differences exist between 
Lösch’s system and the solution of model in the number of goods and the location of central place.  
In Beavon and Mabin (1975: 148), the relative supply of goods in “city-rich sectors” and 
“city-poor sectors” is compared in the number of central places by number of goods in each sector. 
However, to accurately evaluate differences between two sectors, one should consider except the 
nodes on the boundary line demarcating the two sectors (Hayashi 1986: 195). Furthermore, focus 
should be placed on differences not only in the number of central places but also in terms of the actual 
number of market centers where each good is supplied. Table 3 compares the solution of model with 
Lösch’s system by the product of the number of goods and the number of places divided among 
Sector A, Sector B, and the boundary between both sectors, as shown in Figure 13. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sector A Sector B Boundary Sector A Sector B Boundary Sector A Sector B Boundary Sector A Sector B Boundary
1 52 31 5 52 31 5 46 30 7 46 30 7
2 27 32 5 54 64 10 34 32 3 68 64 6
3 25 11 7 75 33 21 21 12 10 63 36 30
4 8 3 2 32 12 8 12 3 2 48 12 8
5 12 8 8 60 40 40 11 6 6 55 30 30
6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 18 0
7 1 2 3 7 14 21 1 1 3 7 7 21
8 1 1 2 8 8 16 1 1 1 8 8 8
9 2 0 1 18 0 9 1 0 1 9 0 9
10 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 10 0 0
11 0 0 1 0 0 11 0 0 1 0 0 11
Total 128 88 34 306 202 141 128 88 34 314 205 130
Number
 of
goods
Lösch's system Solution of model
Nunber of places Number of market centers Nunber of places Number of market centers
Table 3  Comparison of the sectors in the Lösch’s system and 
the solution of model 
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Comparison of the two results shows that there is no change in the total number of places in each 
sector. However, when we compare the number of places that possess multiple goods, i.e., the 
number of places where the number of goods is two or more, then in contrast to Lösch’s system, 
which found a total of 76 such places in Sector A, the solution of model yield 82. In addition, when 
we look at the total number of market centers, whereas Lösch’s system found 306 in Sector A, the 
model finds 314. In other words, the solution of model show a higher degree of prioritization of 
locating in particular sectors, and more “city-rich sectors” are created than in the results of Lösch’s 
superimposition13.  
 
3.5 Testing the rationality of constructing a hierarchy on Lösch’s system 
Why might something like this occur? As mentioned above, Lösch aligned the nearest market 
center from the metropolis with particular sectors on the creation of “city-rich sectors.” However, it is 
not necessarily the case that this choice actually results in the greatest number of market centers in 
particular sectors. For example, Figure 14 shows only the first quadrant of the range of a circle of 
radius √511𝑎 for the market centers of a market area Number 6 from Table 2. Market area Number 
6 has two alternatives, and Figure 14 shows the results of aligning the nearest market center from the 
metropolis with the particular Sector A. Excluding the boundary line, in contrast to eleven centers that 
are located inside Sector A, there are twelve centers located inside Sector B. Namely, at least in regard 
to market area Number 6, in the case of the basis of Lösch’s method, we can say that there will be 
more market centers in “city-poor sectors” than in “city-rich sectors.” 
In the area of the 150 central place system shown by Lösch (the range of the dashed lines in 
Figure 14), the exclusion of one of the market centers in Sector B makes it look like the number of  
                                               
13 Even when we share the number of market centers on the boundary in Table 3 in Sector A and 
Sector B, the total number of market centers for Sector A is greater in the case of the model, with 
376.5 in the Lösch’s system, and 379 in the solution of model. In addition, when the model is 
applied by including the nodes on boundary in the set of particular sectors S, the total number of 
market centers in Sector A becomes 447 in the Lösch’s system and 449 in the solution of model. 
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centers does not change from Sector A to Sector B. While it remains unclear why Lösch chose this 
range for his illustration, it is a fact that this resulted in the obscuration of an “inversion problem” like 
that described above. Whatever the case, to ensure the location of more market centers in “city-rich 
sectors”, we will need to take note of the fact that in some cases it is better to align the nearest market 
Figure 14  Distribution of market centers for market area Number 6 
 
Shaded areas are particular sectors. Dashed lines represent ranges of each market area 
network of the number on the y-axis illustrated by Lösch. Circles from the metropolis with 
the radiuses of the number on the x-axis correspond to ranges in all combinations of the 
market area networks of the number on the y-axis. 
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center from the metropolis with “city-poor sectors.”14 Actually, such a solution has already been 
derived as the solution of model. 
However, whether such “inversion problem” actually occurs will depend on the size of the subject 
area. The range of the central place system for fifty-five market area networks shown by Lösch (1954: 
128) and the area of a circle with radius of 13a, which is equal to the distance between market centers 
in market area Number 55, are shown in Figure 14. Even so, the number of market centers in this 
range remains unchanged in both Sector A and Sector B. However, in the interior of a circle of radius 10√3𝑎 which lies more or less mid-way between the market areas Numbers 55 and 150, Sector A 
contains the locations of seven market centers, in contrast to Sector B which has six (Figure 14). 
Furthermore, turning to the range of ten market area networks shown by Lösch (1954: 118), the fact 
that there are no locations of interest other than the six nearest market centers from the metropolis 
means that it is necessarily divided into sectors in which market centers exist and sectors in which 
they do not.  
Ultimately, as Marshall (1977: 12) has pointed out, the nearest market center from the metropolis 
is no more than the “tip of iceberg”. For example, market areas Numbers 56 through 150 in the 150 
market area networks contain only six market centers inside the subject area of a circle of radius 
√511𝑎, excluding the metropolis. In other words, in the same way as with the range of market area 
Number 10 in Figure 14, only the locations of the nearest market centers from the metropolis 
contribute to relative amounts between sectors in these market area networks. However, as we can 
also infer from Figure 14, when we configure a subject area broader than a circle of radius √511𝑎, 
then even for market areas Numbers 56 through 150, either the differences between sectors will 
disappear or there will be the possibility of a “inversion problem.” 
Importantly, the solution of the objective of prioritization of location in a particular sector is the 
existence of the possibility of change depending on the range of the subject area. In other words, in 
                                               
14 A similar “inversion problem” can be seen in market area Number 25. 
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order to know which alternative to choose in a market area network where multiple alternatives exist, 
it is necessary to survey the whole range of the subject area, that is to say the entirety of the central 
place system, and to pursue its rationality. Missing from Lösch’s process of constructing a hierarchy is 
a perspective towards the rationality of the entire system. 
Nevertheless, of course, this is only natural given the period when Lösch was writing. At the time, 
the methodologies and techniques for solving the combinatorial optimization formulated in this 
chapter had not yet been developed15. What Lösch was able to do, as reproduced by Beavon and 
Mabin (1975), was to apply the geometric processing of aligning nearest market centers from the 
metropolis with particular sectors and to adopt a sequential method of searching for the place with the 
largest number of coincident market centers during processing. In other words, he had to resort to 
heuristic algorithms in which solution is sought on a trial and error basis. However, the application of 
heuristic algorithms does not necessarily guarantee a global optimal solution for the entire system. 
What we should question when trying to understand Lösch’s theory as a superimposition problem 
for market area networks is the nature of Lösch’s original intention in constructing a hierarchy. In 
order to explore the true meaning, it will be necessary to step away from the interpretation by Beavon 
and Mabin (1975) for once and grapple with the task of a reinterpretation that will decipher the 
objective of constructing a hierarchy that Lösch was attempting to pursue. 
 
3.6 Hierarchical arrangement based on the agglomeration effect 
Lösch, after having superimposed his market area networks to achieve “six sectors with many 
production sites,” continues by saying that “with this arrangement the greatest number of production 
locations coincide, the number of local purchases is maximized, the sum of the minimum distances 
                                               
15 The simplex method for solving linear programming and the integer programming formulated in 
this paper was developed in 1947 by Dantzig (Kubo et al. 2002). In addition, the branch and bound 
method that allows the exact solution of combinatorial optimization was developed later, and 
depending on the size of the problem, the use of a computer can be essential for solving problems 
such as these. 
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between industrial locations is least, and in consequence not only transportation amount but also 
transport lines are reduced to a minimum” (Lösch 1954: 124). From this description, it is clear that 
Lösch had taken into account the notion of agglomeration economies in the supply of goods (Webber 
1971: 17). If the advantage of agglomeration was Lösch’s original objective, then the prioritization of 
locations in particular sectors would simply be a means of achieving that end. Therefore, let us then 
consider the agglomeration effect of goods brought about by the economies of agglomeration and 
attempt to reformulate the model in the previous section. 
The objective pertaining to the agglomeration effect of goods is also expressed in the 
maximization of the number of coincident market centers, which is addressed by the second term on 
the right-hand side of objective function (15). Here, when the second term on right-hand side of 
objective function (15) is expanded, the second objective divides into the maximization of the total 
number of market centers and the minimization of the total number of central places. Assuming that 
market centers are determined in advance for each market area network and that the subject area is a 
circle of a certain radius from the metropolis, there will be no difference in the number of market 
centers between alternatives that keep the same distance between market centers. In other words, the 
number of market centers will not change no matter which alternative is chosen from the market area 
networks corresponding to each good. Thus, because the total number of market centers in the subject 
area is a constant value, the objective of maximizing of the number of coincident market centers is 
synonymous with the minimization of the total number of central places. 
The minimization of the total number of central places is introduced by Parr and Denike (1970: 
572), Parr (1973: 187), and Mulligan (1984: 10), among others, as a condition that represents the 
agglomeration effects in Lösch’s hierarchical arrangement. However, for my own part, I do not 
believe that the agglomeration effect of goods can be properly represented by means of the 
minimization of the total number of central places. Let us consider this effect concretely, assuming an 
agglomeration of four kinds of goods ranging from a lower-order good Number 1 to a higher-order 
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good Number 4, as listed in Table 4.  
The circle mark in Table 4 shows that each good is supplied in a place and there are 16 different 
conceivable patterns according to whether or not four kinds of goods are supplied in each place. 
These patterns can be divided roughly into an agglomerated locational pattern that possesses two or 
more goods and other non-agglomerated locational pattern. The non-agglomerated locational pattern 
is classified into “nothing” when none of goods are supplied, and “single good” when any one of a 
good is supplied. Furthermore, the agglomerated locational pattern is classified into “complete 
agglomeration” when all goods, from the hierarchical marginal good (Berry and Garrison 1958a) 
down to the lowest-order good Number 1, are supplied, and “partial agglomeration” when goods can 
be seen to be missing lower-order goods than the hierarchical marginal good. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nothing
4 ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
3 ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
2 ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
1 ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 2 3 4
0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 2 3
0 0 1 2 3 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 0 0 0
Number of coincident
market centers
Number of
missing goods
Order of
 goods
Central place location
Number of goods
Non-agglomerated location Agglomerated location
Single good Partial agglomeration Complete agglomeration
Table 4  Relationship between types and effects of agglomeration 
in the case of four kinds of goods 
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“Central place location” in Table 4 is the same as Fj in objective function (15) and “number of 
goods” refers to the number of goods supplied at a respective place. Therefore, “number of coincident 
market centers” corresponds to the number in which “central place location” is subtracted from 
“number of goods”. Looking at the number of coincident market centers, while the values are both 0 
in cases of “nothing” and “single good”, both take a positive value in cases of “partial agglomeration” 
and “complete agglomeration”, in accordance with the degree of agglomeration. While it is possible 
to distinguish the agglomerated locational pattern by the number of coincident market centers, the 
problem will be whether or not the agglomeration effect of goods is accurately expressed by the 
relevant indicators.  
For example, for the pattern whereby three kinds of goods (goods Numbers 1, 2, and 3) are 
supplied in “complete agglomeration” and the pattern whereby good Number 1 is missing from 
among goods Numbers 1 through 4 in “partial agglomeration”, the number of coincident market 
centers is two as both of which are the same value, but can they both truly be said to have the same 
agglomeration effect? In general, lower-order goods have higher convenience than higher-order 
goods, with a greater number of supply points. Accordingly, regarding the goods supplied at places, 
the case of higher-order good Number 4 missing from Table 4 would have a different significance 
than the case of when lowest-order good Number 1 is missing despite the fact that higher-order goods 
than good Number 1 are supplied. In addition, in situations where the total number of market centers 
is constant, such as the one described above, anything other than a “nothing” of 0 will be regarded as 
having the same degree of agglomeration because the “central place location“ ends up being the only 
indicator for determining the agglomeration effect. 
When considered in this manner, neither the number of coincident market centers nor the number 
of central places can be regarded as an adequate indicator for capturing the agglomeration effect of 
goods. Therefore, in this paper, I focus particularly on the number of missing goods as an alternative 
indicator of the agglomeration effect of goods. The number of missing goods is the number of goods 
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missed lower-order goods than the hierarchical marginal good. It is possible to distinguish clearly 
between complete agglomeration and partial agglomeration, because the number of missing goods 
becomes to zero in the former but takes a positive value corresponding to the degree of agglomeration 
in the latter. Moreover, the difference can be identified by using the number of missing goods even if 
a part of “nothing” and “partial agglomeration” is considered to be the same agglomeration effect 
when measuring the pattern by the number of coincident market centers. 
If we use the number of missing goods as an index of the agglomeration effect, then we can 
realize the economies of agglomeration by minimizing the total number of missing goods. Here, 
reformulating the model for the problem of superimposing market area networks, we may revise the 
objective function (15) with the objective that seeks to minimize of the total number of missing goods, 
as in following formula (22), and add the following constraints to constraints (16), (17), (19), and 
(20): 
 
 minZ = �𝐴𝑖
𝑖
 (22)  
 
subject to: 
 
𝐴𝑖 + � 𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑗−1
𝑖
− (𝑚 − 1)𝑌𝑖𝑗 ≥ 0   ∀ 𝑗,𝑚 ≥ 2 (23)  
 𝐴𝑖 ≥ 0     ∀ 𝑗 (24)  
 
where: 
Aj = the number of missing goods at node j. 
 
Constraints (23) and (24) specify the number of missing goods. Specifically, if node j is assumed a 
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place where possess two kinds of goods (goods Numbers 2 and 4) as “partial agglomeration” in Table 
4, then because 𝐴𝑖 ≥ 2 when goods m = 4, 𝐴𝑖 ≥ 0 when m = 3, and 𝐴𝑖 ≥ 1 when m = 2, we 
will end up with 𝐴𝑖 ≥ 2. Because Aj is minimized by the objective function (22), Aj will take a value 
of 2. 
 
3.7 Testing the agglomeration effect 
Let us apply our model for minimizing the total number of missing goods to the superimposition 
problem for market area networks. Because the size of the problem has grown with the addition of 
our new constraints, our discussion limits to the 55 market area networks shown in Table 2. Assuming 
the distance between settlements to be a, the circle of radius 13a, which is the distance between 
market centers for market area Number 55, contains 613 nodes on the discrete lattice network of 
regular equilateral triangles. Solving the problem of dealing with the 101 market area networks that 
integrate all alternatives for the 55 market area networks, we derive the result shown in Figure 15-a 
and an objective function value of 8,640, which represents the total number of missing goods. The 
difference in the number of market centers between sectors is less than that shown in the diagram 
given by Lösch (1954: 128) for a central place system of 55 market areas16. However, from the fact 
that calculating the total number of missing goods in the figure presented by Lösch yields a result of 
9,240, the solution of model show a higher agglomeration effect of goods. That is, if our objective 
adequately represents the notion of agglomeration economies in the supply of goods, then we can say 
that the prioritization of location in particular sectors is not a necessary requirement. 
That said, because one center of each market area network is fixed as the metropolis and market 
area networks of different sizes in relation to each good are superimposed, the metropolis as center 
point of the subject area is the only location where complete agglomeration can be achieved while  
                                               
16 In terms of the relative numbers of “city-rich sectors” and “city-poor sectors”, comparing the total 
number of market centers, Lösch’s results show 75 and 44 respectively, while the solution of model 
yield 63 and 56. 
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supplying multiple goods. By applying the model, it is possible to derive the central place system that 
results in the maximum agglomeration effect of goods. However, this effect will still be limited, even 
when the agglomeration effect is determined only for the combination of goods supplied at each 
point. 
When we determine the agglomeration effect without limiting the combination of goods at a 
single place, including goods supplied at neighboring places, we can apply the model more flexibly. 
For example, as in Table 4, let us assume the supply of four kinds of goods at the five places A 
through E shown in Figure 16. Of the five places, only place D satisfies complete agglomeration on 
its own, whereas at the other places either only good Number 1 is supplied or there is some missing 
good. Here, if the goods in the possession of neighboring places were able to complement the missing 
goods from the place in question, then we could expect an improved agglomeration effect. Now, 
focusing on place C, we see that point C is determined to have partial agglomeration, with the supply 
Figure 15  Solutions of the model based on the agglomeration effect 
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of two kinds of goods (goods Numbers 2 and 4). However, goods Numbers 1 and 3, which are not 
supplied at place C, are present at the neighboring points B and D. This distance to the adjacent places 
will be regarded as the “neighborhood range” of place C, and if we evaluate the agglomeration of 
goods inside the neighborhood range, then it will be determined that place C offers complete 
agglomeration. 
However, when we evaluate place D using the same method, it is necessary not to consider good 
Number 4 which is supplied at place C. This is because when our evaluation includes good Number 4, 
point D—which satisfies complete agglomeration on its own—will be regarded as showing partial 
agglomeration that lacks good Number 3. Accordingly, the object for complementary goods in a 
Figure 16  Agglomeration by the neighborhood effect 
 
Round marks indicate the goods supplied at each place. 
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neighborhood range should be limited to the lower-order missing goods as seen from the hierarchical 
marginal good occurring at the respective place. As a result, a pattern of complete agglomeration will 
be determined for place B up to good Number 3, for place C up to good Number 4, and for place D 
up to good Number 2. 
Denoting locations with localized clusters of firms as integrated units seems to be a viable idea, 
although it also depends on the configuration of the distance between places and neighborhood range. 
What Lösch refers to as “the sum of the minimum distances between industrial locations is least” and 
“the maximum number of purchases can be made locally” is not what can be achieved solely at a 
specific place but places at which the agglomeration effect is considered including neighboring firms, 
as a result of which multi-purpose shopping behavior is facilitated for the consumers (Eaton and 
Lipsey 1982: 58). 
The problem of minimizing the total number of missing goods for a configured neighborhood 
range can be expressed by replacing constraint (23) with the addition of the following: 
 
subject to: 
 
𝐴𝑖 + � 𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑗−1
𝑖
− (𝑚 − 1)𝑌𝑖𝑗 ≥ 0   ∀ 𝑗,𝑚 ≥ 2 (25)  
 
𝐵𝑖𝑗 − �𝑌𝑙𝑗
𝑙∈𝐶𝑗
≤ 0   ∀ 𝑗,𝑚 (26)  
 𝐵𝑖𝑗 − 𝑌𝑙𝑗 ≥ 0   ∀ 𝑗,𝑚, 𝑙 ∈ 𝐶𝑖 (27)  
 𝐵𝑖𝑗 = 0,1     ∀ 𝑗,𝑚 (28)  
 
where: 
1 if good m is supplied inside the neighborhood range of node j; 
 Bjm =  
  0 otherwise; 
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Cj = the set of nodes inside the neighborhood range of node j. 
 
Constraints (26) through (28) hold that when good m is supplied in the neighborhood range of 
node j, Bjm = 1, and that when there is no supply at any node, then Bjm = 0. As well as constraint (23), 
constraint (25) is a condition that determines the number of missing goods, and when good m is not 
supplied at node j, and then there will be no count of missing goods for the good in question. 
Accordingly, goods whose order are higher than that of the hierarchical marginal good will have no 
relation to the calculation of the number of missing goods. While we can determine the configuration 
of neighborhood range for each node, for the sake of convenience, we may configure this as the nodes 
included inside a circle of a specified radius R as 𝐶𝑖 = �𝑙|𝑑𝑖𝑙 ≤ 𝑅�. 
Applying the model to the superimposition problem of 55 market area networks with a radius R 
as the distance a between settlements, the central place system shown in Figure 15-b is drawn as the 
solution of model. Calculating the number of missing goods, including adjacent nodes, yields an 
objective function value of 6,120, which can be confirmed as an improved agglomeration effect when 
compared with the result of Figure 15-a, in which the neighborhood range is not configured. In 
addition, from the fact that the total number of missing goods is 6,648 when considering the 
complementing of goods from neighboring nodes in the diagram presented by Lösch, we can say that 
the solution of model yield a higher agglomeration effect even when a neighborhood range is set. 
The complementary effect of goods from the neighborhood range allows a complete 
agglomeration pattern to be derived even from nodes other than the metropolis. Specifically, whereas 
Lösch finds 30 nodes with complete agglomeration up to good Number 2, the model yields 36 nodes 
with complete agglomeration up to good Number 2, and six nodes with complete agglomeration up 
to good Number 3. However, as with Figure 15-a, the difference of the number of market centers 
between 30-degree sectors is not clear (Figure 15-b). Because goods are rather seen to agglomerate in 
a narrow range moving counter clockwise from the boundary between each sector, the same kind of 
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dense pattern of agglomeration of goods appears in every sector. Of the 55 market area networks 
shown in Table 2, the market centers for sixteen market area networks with no multiple alternatives 
will necessarily be located on the boundary line between 30-degree sectors. Therefore, the 
complementary effect with these market centers on the boundary lines might have caused tendency of 
agglomeration of goods around the boundary lines. 
We can easily imagine that the agglomeration effect changes depending on the setting of the 
neighborhood range. In this chapter, while the neighborhood range has defined as a circle of a 
specified radius at each node, as the radius increases in size, the complementary effect of missing 
goods will rise, and the number of missing goods will tend to decrease overall. On the other hand, by 
variably configuring the radius of the neighborhood range for different nodes and by setting 
neighborhood ranges for only specific nodes, we could consider a regional difference of 
agglomeration effect or a regional planning of agglomeration. If we assume that Lösch’s objective in 
hierarchical arrangement as the realization of the economies of agglomeration, by using the 
reinterpretation that we have given to the agglomeration effect of goods in this chapter, we could 
bring Lösch’s intention to fruition. In addition, the model to minimize the total number of missing 
goods can be considered as the extended model in which more flexible central place systems can be 
derived concerning the hierarchical structure. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
Generalization of central place theory 
 
Thus far, through the process of modelling Lösch’s market area theory, we have attempted the 
extension of the model to the location of single good and to hierarchical arrangement as seen from the 
agglomeration effect of goods. In general, as against Lösch’s market area theory, which seeks to 
maximize the number of firms on the basis of the concept of threshold, Christaller’s central place 
theory has been regarded as a model for the supply of goods from the minimum number of firms on 
the basis of the upper limit of the range of goods (Saey 1973; Matsubara 2006). Comparing both 
theories from the perspective of hierarchical structure, as opposed to Lösch’s central place systems, in 
which partial agglomeration of goods is inevitably caused, Christaller’s central place theory, in which 
central places hold all lower order goods than the hierarchical marginal good, posits a complete 
agglomeration pattern for every central place. In this chapter, I would like to summarize the 
differences between Lösch’s and Christaller’s theories in order to generalize both theories by a unified 
model. 
 
4.1 Reinterpreting central place theory from the perspective of the locational 
principle 
Given the results of our discussion in Chapter 2, as with Figure 2-a, some similarities can be 
pointed out between Christaller’s theory and the problem of maximizing total profit, which realizes 
fewer locations while covering nodes to the upper limit of the for a good S17. However, for clarifying 
the differences in Lösch’s and Christaller’s theories and for positioning both theories in the framework 
                                               
17 In this regard, Ishikawa and Toda (2000) discussed the systematic change of Christaller’s central 
place systems when firms take action to maximize profit. 
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of the locational principle, it will be necessary to examine carefully the locational process as seen 
from the structure of model, rather than focusing solely on the number and pattern of locations as 
results of the model. Therefore, in what follows, taking a cue from the model in objective function 
(14), which extends Lösch’s theory with regard to the location of single good, I would like to 
reinterpret Lösch’s and Christaller’s theories, particularly from the perspective of the locational 
principle. 
First, substituting the right-hand side of objective functions (1) and (13) for the two objectives Z1 
and Z2, respectively, in objective function (14), the objective function (14) can be summarized as 
follows: 
 
 maxZ = �� 𝑎𝑖𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑋𝑖𝑖
𝑖∈𝑁𝑖𝑖
− 𝑤�𝑡𝑌𝑖
𝑖
 (29)  
 
Moreover, when the quantity of demand qij is defined as in Equation (10), which expresses the 
demand cone, the objective function is expressed as the following equation composed of three 
terms18: 
 
 maxZ = ��𝑄𝑎𝑖𝑋𝑖𝑖
𝑖∈𝑁𝑖𝑖
−�� 𝛽𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑋𝑖𝑖
𝑖∈𝑁𝑖𝑖
− 𝑤�𝑡𝑌𝑖
𝑖
 (30)  
 
Here, let us speculate on the locational principles of the three terms on the right-hand side of 
objective function (30). The first term seeks to maximize the value obtained by multiplying 
population ai by maximum demand Q for the set of points Ni inside radius S. Because maximum 
                                               
18 Erlenkotter (1977), for example, has developed three terms in a similar manner to this formulation 
for the maximization of total profit problem. 
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demand Q is a constant value, the first term ultimately signifies the maximization of the population 
covered by the upper limit of the range of a good S. This is none other than the maximum covering 
location problem (Church and ReVelle 1974), which seeks maximum coverage for a population 
within a specified coverage distance. Interpreted likewise, the second term corresponds to the median 
problem for minimizing the total distance travelled (ReVelle and Swain 1970) because it maximizes 
the negative value of a population-weighted distance; whereas the third term corresponds to the 
so-called location set covering problem (Toregas et al. 1971) in the sense that it minimizes the number 
of locations multiplied by the threshold constant t when all demand nodes are covered by radius S. 
In other words, the extended model in the location of single good that was presented in Chapter 2, 
among the basic location-allocation models (Ishizaki 2003), may be considered to combine the three 
models, with the exception that it excludes the center problem. However, depending on conditions, 
the three objectives are in some cases not subject to optimization. First of all, the first term becomes 
meaningless when all demand nodes are covered by radius S. In other words, if the coverage 
condition shown in constraint (3) expresses equality rather than inequality, the first term becomes a 
constant and thus excluded from optimization. Next, cases where the second term is satisfied are 
limited to those that assume the demand cone where the distance elasticity of demand β takes a 
positive value. When β = 0, the second term will not be subject to optimization, and the quantity of 
demand will take a discrete value of either Q or 0. Further, for the third term, when w = 0, i.e., when 
the extended model is expressed as a total demand maximization problem, it will be excluded from 
the object for optimization. 
Given this way, it is possible to classify objective function (30) into the combination of several 
models according to the three objects. Table 5 shows the well-known location-allocation models and 
other models that become relevant for combinations of these three objectives—the maximum 
coverage of demand for the first term, the minimization of total distance traveled for the second term, 
and the minimization of the number of locations for the third term. As mentioned above, although  
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objective function (30) corresponds to each of the three basic models when only one of its terms is 
satisfied19, when none of the three terms is the object to be optimized, it cannot be established as an 
optimization problem. On the other hand, there are also models that consist of combinations of two 
objectives. For example, a model combining the minimization of total distance traveled with the 
minimization of the number of locations will have the same form as a generalized median problem 
(Mavrides 1979)20. In addition, the fixed charge maximal covering location problem (Church and 
                                               
19 Under a strict definition, because the constraints of the upper limit of the range of a good are taken 
into account, the median problem is also with maximum distance constraints problem (Khumawala 
1973). Moreover, if we apply the threshold condition presented in constraint (2), we get a median 
problem with threshold requirements (Carreras and Serra 1999), which resolves as a problem of 
maximum coverage with threshold constraints (Balakrishnan and Storbeck 1991). 
20 While not specifically formulated as a multiobjective programming solution by Mavrides (1979), 
Church and Davis (1992) extended the generalized median problem with multiobjective 
programming. In addition, the generalized median problem takes the same form as the plant 
―― Set covering problem
Median problem Generalized median problem
（Christaller's model）
Maximal covering problem Fixed charge maximal coveringproblem
Total demand maximization
problem
（Lösch's model）
Flexible central place model
Coverage
condition
Elasticity of
demand
Weight
Table 5  Classification of the extended model based on locational 
principles 
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Davis 1992), formulated as a multiobjective programming solution for a maximal coverage problem 
and fixed charge minimization problem, can be regarded as a composite model of the first and third 
terms. 
Here, how are Lösch's market area theory and Christaller’s central place theory defined in Table 
5? As described earlier in Chapter 2, because we can formulate Lösch's market area theory as the total 
demand maximization problem, it may be understood, from objective function (30), as a composite 
model of the first and second terms. However, because the third term—which adjusts the number of 
locations—is not included, we will need a constraint to determine the number of firms. This is also 
why constraints that fix the number of locations are necessary in usual median problem and maximal 
covering location problem. In Lösch's market area theory, the number of firms is decided by the 
threshold condition shown in constraint (2). This is because, without constraint (2), all firms would be 
located in all potential firm location nodes. 
Additionally, because the range of a circle whose radius is the upper limit of the range of a good is 
typically greater than that of a market area that meets the threshold; consequently, it is possible that all 
demand nodes can be covered under a radius S. In particular, this is inevitable where a population’s 
distribution is regular and uniform, and because this results in the first term of objective function (30) 
becoming a constant, it will therefore be excluded as the object to be optimized.21 Therefore, to 
establish the total demand maximization problem as an optimization problem, the second term 
becomes a prerequisite. In other words, the distance elasticity of demand must always be β > 0. From 
this, the concept of the demand cone and the threshold condition for determining the number of firms 
are essential for Lösch’s market area theory. 
                                                                                                                                              
location problem, which seeks to minimize transportation costs and fixed costs (Efroymson and 
Ray 1966). 
21 In other words, it turns into a median problem. ReVelle et al. (1975) have indicated a similar case 
with comment to a model resembling the total demand maximization problem presented by 
Holmes et al. (1972). However, in the case of a non-uniform population distribution, as shown in 
Figure 6-c, the possibility of the occurrence of demand nodes that lack supply implies that first 
term may be the object to be optimized. 
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On the other hand, with regard to Christaller’s central place theory, as Saey (1973) and Beaumont 
(1987) have pointed out, one possible interpretation is that of set covering problem that seeks fewest 
locations while ensuring coverage over a region within the upper limit of the range of a good. 
Because the set covering problem implies that only the third term in objective function (30) will be 
optimized, there will always be the same number of locations, regardless of the value of the constants 
weight w and threshold t. Basically, the upper limit of the range of a good S affects the number of 
locations22. However, some questions remain about whether Christaller’s theory can be reinterpreted 
as the set covering problem alone. As clarified by Ishizaki (1992, 1995), this is because the marketing 
principle underlying Christaller’s central place theory does not necessarily assume the coverage of all 
goods with the minimum number of firms. 
According to Christaller’s discussion, when the seven central places that were called B-places are 
required to be distributed equally, some unsupplied areas appear at the supply of good Number 20. 
Then, because “it is more reasonable to suppose that the places which should regularly supply the 
unsupplied ring with central good Number 20”, “other central places, which we call K, must lie at 
those points farthest distant from the neighboring B-places” (Christaller 1966: 61-62). However, as a 
result, there will no longer be the minimum number of firms to supply a good Number 20. In the case 
of good Number 21, which is supplied from the seven B-places, the overlapping of the circles of 
which the radius is equal to the upper limit of the range of the good is kept to a minimum, and the 
number of firms to supply the relevant good is also minimized. However, good Number 20 whose 
order is lower by one is now supplied by a total of 13 places at B-places and K-places, and the overlap 
also becomes excessive. 
The reason for a lack of consistency between the number of firms and the extent of coverage by 
the difference of good is that in Christaller’s central place theory, it is the central place, rather than 
                                               
22 In a set covering problem, the coverage distance will determine the number of locations covered 
overall. However, in the case of a non-uniform population distribution, the number of locations 
may be considered to vary depending on the threshold condition in constraint (2). 
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each individual firm, that is subject to location. Central places possess all goods of lower order than 
the hierarchical marginal good (i.e. successively inclusive). Accordingly, when considering the 
location of central places, it is necessary to consider all goods held by the central place, rather than to 
pursue optimality solely for the supply of specific goods. In this regard, Ishizaki (1995) interprets the 
locational principle of the marketing principle as a problem for arranging the aggregate range of 
goods from a higher to lower order.  
Thus, is there any reason why we should not be able to specify some kind of locational principle 
in Christalller’s theory in relation to the location of single good? In the process of deriving central 
place systems on the basis of the marketing principle, Christaller relies exclusively on the upper limit 
of the range of a good in his explanation. Such an explanation seems to give the impression only the 
coverage by firms is assumed to be an issue23. However, when Christaller discussed the concept of 
the range of goods, we should pay attention to the fact that he has considered the same notion of 
demand cone by using the example of a relationship between the doctor established at the center and 
the distance decay effect of the number of consultations (Morikawa 1980: 38).  
My own thoughts are as follows. Namely, although the reason why central places to be added are 
needed is certainly due to the coverage of unsupplied area, the optimality based on the notion of 
demand cone might be implicitly considered about the problem of where a firm that supply a good 
establish themselves. This idea implies that the distance elasticity of demand in the extended model is 
β > 0, and, as a result, the second term of objective function (30) is added to the set covering problem. 
In other words, the locational principle for single good in Christaller’s central place theory, while 
assuming the set covering problem as its basic model, might also be interpreted as the generalized 
median problem in Table 5, which adds the minimization of total weighted-distance to its objectives24.  
                                               
23 Especially, in Beavon (1977: 18-27), the coverage of the circle whose radius is the upper limit of 
the range of a good is given particular emphasis in the supplementary explanation of Christaller’s 
central place theory. 
24 In this sense, the interpretation given in Berry and Garrison (1958a), which apprehends the 
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Importantly, the generalized median problem, which corresponds to a composite model of the 
second and third terms from objective function (30), has been formulated as a multiobjective 
programming that can grasp the number of firms variably depending on the weight w. In Christaller’s 
theory, as mentioned earlier, while there are cases that lack the minimum number of firms depending 
on the good, this can be explained if interpreted as the result of seeking a compromise solution 
between the two objectives of minimizing the number of firms and minimizing total 
weighted-distance. 
For example, because the non-inferior solution shown in Table 1 ends up with the coverage of all 
demand nodes within radius S, the first term in objective function (30) will be a constant, and the 
non-inferior solution, in fact, becomes synonymous with a generalized median problem. Thus, if we 
consider that for each good it is possible to select the appropriate alternative from among the various 
non-inferior solutions for number of firms, from the minimum number to the maximum number, then 
Christaller's central place theory may be said to envision an extremely flexible model, at least with 
respect to the locational principle for single good. 
As described above, when we try clarifying both Lösch’s and Christaller’s theories from the 
perspective of the locational principle for single good, we are able to interpret the former as a 
composite model comprising first and second terms from objective function (30), and the latter as a 
composite model comprising the second and third terms. Then, as in Table 5, it is possible to say 
“flexible central place model” in which all three terms are the objects to be optimized, in the sense 
that it acts as a bridge between Lösch’s market area theory and Christaller’s central place theory. The 
flexible central place model practically becomes Christaller’s central place theory when all demand 
nodes end up being covered, and Lösch’s market area theory when the weight w is as close as 
                                                                                                                                              
location of central places from the perspective of the minimization of the total distance traveled, 
could not necessarily be said to be mistaken. However, because they emphasized the threshold 
condition in order to determine the number of firms as well as Lösch’s theory, Saey (1973) points 
out the confusion of Christaller’s theory with that of Lösch. 
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possible to 0. 
 
4.2 Christaller’s central place theory as a superimposition problem for market 
area networks 
If we accept the interpretation in the previous section as correct, then, because the number of 
firms—as opposed to in Lösch’s theory, wherein it is uniquely determined on the basis of the 
threshold—in Christaller’s central place theory is understood as variable, it will be possible to derive 
multiple market areas of different sizes even for a single good. 
As in Chapter 3, when we assume Christaller’s central place theory as a superimposition problem 
for market area networks, we need to take note of the relationship between each good and its 
corresponding market area network. Figure 17 shows that multiple market area networks are 
compatible with a single good. Each good is associated with one of the market area networks from 
the upper limit of the range of the good to the threshold (the lower limit of the range of the good). The 
market area network of the former is shaped with least number of market centers while the latter case 
reaches the maximum number of market centers. As a result, the number of combinations that 
associate each good with each market area network is even greater than that in the superimposition 
problem of Figure 11, which illustrates Lösch’s hierarchical arrangement. 
Here, let us try to reproduce Christaller’s central place system on the basis of the agglomeration 
effect of goods shown in objective function (22). When multiple market area networks are accessible, 
as in Figure 17, the agglomeration effect of goods alone will be inadequate as an objective function 
for solving the superimposition problem for market area networks. This is because there can be 
multiple solutions comprising various combinations of market area networks even for the same 
agglomeration effect, by increasing the degree of freedom for potential market area networks. As 
discussed in the previous section, if the locational principle for single good in Christaller's central 
place theory is based on the set covering problem, then we can add the objective of minimizing the  
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number of market centers in order to specify the solution. 
However, in the finite space that takes as its subject area a circle of a specified radius as 
configured in Chapter 3, the number of market centers cannot be distinguished because there are 
cases where market area networks of different sizes have the same number of market centers. In that 
Figure 17  Superimposition of market area networks of 
the Christaller’s system 
 
The legend is the same as Figure 11. The arrows from a good number to area numbers 
indicate that one good corresponds to the alternatives of two or more market area networks 
from the upper limit of the range of a good to its lower limit. 
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case, we can use the distance between market centers for each market area network as an alternative 
index for expressing the number of market centers in a certain range. Because location density 
decreases as this distance grows, we will be able to minimize the number of market centers by 
maximizing the distance between market centers. 
Thus, when formulating these two objectives of minimizing the total number of missing goods, 
which expresses the agglomeration effect of goods, and maximizing the total distance between 
market centers, which is standing in for the minimization of the total number of market centers, we 
can express them in the following formula: 
 
 minZ = 𝑤�𝐴𝑖
𝑖
− (1 −𝑤)� � 𝑑𝑖𝑋𝑗𝑖
𝑖∈𝑁𝑚𝑗
 (31)  
 
where: 
di = distance between market centers for market area network i. 
 
The second term in objective function (31) is synonymous with a maximization problem because 
of minimizing the negative value of the total distance between market centers. The weight w takes a 
value 0 < w < 1. 
The model is applied to the subject area as the range of a circle with the distance between market 
centers for market area Number 55 as the radius to address the problem of optimizing objective 
function (31) under the constraints (16) , (17), (19), and (20), with the addition of constraints (23) and 
(24). It is well known that Christaller considered goods with varying ranges, starting from good 
Number 21 that had an upper limit of the range of 21 km, and then proceeding in 1 km increments. 
According to Christaller (1966: 60-62), a total of 21 kinds of goods originating in B-place up to 
M-place are for consideration: from good Number 21 down to good Number 4, as well as goods 
74 
 
Numbers 22 through 24, which are of a higher order than good Number 21. 
Here, let us assume that the entire plane market is covered with some circles of the upper limit of 
the range of a good without overlapping as much as possible. In that case, the distance between 
market centers for each good will correspond to √3 times the upper limit of the range of the good 
because the market centers are distributed in a lattice network of regular equilateral triangles. 
Therefore, the market area network that the distance between market centers match with a value √3 
times the good number can be considered to be the market area network associated with the upper 
limit of the range of each good. Now, if we assume that a distance between settlements is 4 km25, then 
the market area network that corresponds to the upper limit of the range of good Number 24 is market 
area Number 37 as listed in Table 2. In addition, all market area networks will be able to cope down to 
market area Number 1, which corresponds to the lowest-order good, because “the lower limit of the 
range will definitely be more elastic” (Christaller 1966: 61). Consequently, when integrating the 
number of alternatives in Table 2, we find 63 market area networks that correspond to the good 
Number 24. The set of market area networks that can correspond to each good Nm is defined in a 
similar way. 
When the model is applied by adjusting the weight w in increments of 0.001 from 0.001 to 0.999, 
the twenty non-inferior solutions shown in Figure 18-d are derived. On the right-hand side of 
objective function (31), there is a trade-off relationship between the first term (the total number of 
missing goods) and the second term (the total distance between market centers). Among the 
non-inferior solutions, the total number of missing goods for Solution A—which gives highest 
priority to the first term—is 0, implying that complete agglomeration is achieved for all central places. 
However, because the solutions other than Solution A yield a positive value for the total number of 
missing goods, there is a mixture of central places with a single good and of those where partial  
                                               
25 Christaller used 4 km, the area radius of M-place, as the basis for specific distances in the central 
place system (Hayashi 1986: 117). If the distance between settlements is set to 4 km, then the 
market area of M-places, which are the lowest place of central place hierarchy, can exist. 
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Figure 18  Non-inferior solutions of the generalized model using 
multiobjective programming 
The numerals in figure a) through c) indicate the number of goods. Filled circles in 
figure d) show obtained non-inferior solutions; in parentheses of Solution A through C 
among non-inferior solutions, the left numerical value indicates the total number of 
missing goods and the right numerical value indicates the total distance of market 
centers. 
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agglomeration means that some goods are missing. This is because when optimality for the first term 
is lost, the distance between market centers increases, achieving a minimization of the number of 
market centers. 
Figure 18-a shows the results of Solution A, we find that the central places that supply all 21 kinds 
of goods are located not only in the center of the subject area but that there are also six locations at 
equal intervals along a 9a ring (i.e. 36km) away from the center. Furthermore, at the centers of the 
regular equilateral triangles, created by the higher-order central places, are located lower-order central 
places that supply the 17 kinds of goods comprising goods Numbers 4 through 20. Goods Numbers 4 
through 6 correspond to the market area Number 1, goods Numbers 7 through 11 in the market area 
Number 4, goods Numbers 12 through 20 in the market area Number 11, and goods Numbers 21 
through 24 in the market area Number 30, and the hierarchical differentiation that emerges as the 
result of these respective correspondences, shown in Figure 18-a, illustrates that this central place 
system is undeniably based on Christaller’s marketing principle. In Figure 18-a, in addition to central 
places corresponding to B-places and K-places above, A-place, which supplies eight kinds of goods 
(Numbers 4 through 11), and M-place, which in terms of the marketing principle belongs to the 
lowest-order of the hierarchy, are located at the center of regular equilateral triangles formed by the 
higher-order central places in the same manner as K-place. Namely, assuming a variable number of 
market centers for each good, the most rational solution when superimposing market area networks 
such that there are as few locations as possible while keeping complete agglomeration in play is the 
schema given by the marketing principle. 
On the other hand, when the objective of minimizing the total number of market centers is given 
priority over the agglomeration effect, the maximum value for the distance between market centers is 
497.3, as in Solution C show in Figure 18-d. In this case, the market area networks corresponding to 
each good are all consistent with the market area numbers corresponding to the upper limit of the 
range of the good. From Figure 18-c, which yields the results of Solution C, beyond the center of a 
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subject area that has been fixed as a metropolis, we find central place systems of partial agglomeration 
or single good in which hierarchy has become unclear. This is the same pattern as in Figure 15-a, and 
despite differences in the upper or lower limit—in the sense that a market area network of a unique 
size is associated with each good—it is the same as the hierarchical arrangement presented by Lösch. 
In practice, commercial districts are not always provided with every good, starting from the 
highest- to lowest-order goods, supplied at a given place. Simultaneously, cities that possess 
higher-order central functions without any lower-order functions are probably rare. While what are 
referred to as “central places” depends on the sort of areal units or spatial scales in which they are 
understood, at the very least, it would be difficult to imagine that only the central place systems in 
Figures 18-a and 18-c reproduce actual commercial districts or urban hierarchy. For example, in 
Figure 18-b, which shows Solution B from Figure 18-d, when some central places lose goods and the 
situation moves from that shown in Figure 18-a, in which all central places have complete 
agglomeration, to one of partial agglomeration, a central place system forms that exhibits a location 
pattern and hierarchy distinct from the marketing principle. By generalizing with multiobjective 
programming, it is possible to seek flexible solutions that lie between the two objectives. It could be 
that central place systems that could actually exist in reality might be found in a schema with these 
diverse hierarchies, wherein the agglomeration effect of goods works, but it does so gradually. 
 
4.3 Generalized model of central place theory 
If objective function (30) is a model that situates the theories of both Christaller and Lösch within 
the locational principle for single good, and objective function (22) is a model that reproduces the 
hierarchy of central place systems on the basis of the agglomeration effect of goods, then by 
integrating both models it will be possible to build a model that can generalize the central place 
theory. 
Now, defining the objective function (30) for a good m and assuming the right-hand side to be Lm, 
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we can extend the locational principle for single good to the problem of multiple goods as in the 
following formula: 
 
 
𝐿𝑗 = � � 𝑄𝑗𝑎𝑖𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑗
𝑖∈𝑁𝑖𝑚𝑖
−� � 𝛽𝑗𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑗
𝑖∈𝑁𝑖𝑚𝑖
− 𝑤𝑗�𝑡𝑗𝑌𝑖𝑗
𝑖
 (32)  
 
Here, as with objective function (31), when we formulate Lm as the locational principle for each 
good and the agglomeration effect of goods using multiobjective programming, a model integrating 
the hierarchical arrangement and the locational principle of central place theory can be defined as 
follows: 
 
 minZ = 𝑊�𝐴𝑖
𝑖
− (1 −𝑊)�𝐿𝑗
𝑗
 (33)  
 
On the basis of objective function (33), let us try to reinterpret Christaller’s and Lösch’s theories. 
If Lm expresses a generalized median problem, the objective of minimizing the total number of firms 
is included in the second term of objective function (33). When the weight W takes a relatively large 
value, giving priority to the first term, the objective function value of the first term becomes 0, 
deriving Christaller’s central place system, which fulfills complete agglomeration. Conversely, when 
Lm is synonymous with the total demand maximization problem and the weight W assumes a 
relatively small value that gives priority to the second term, then the market area for each good will be 
limited to a minimum size according to the threshold, and the maximum number of firms will be 
achieved. As per our reinterpretation in Chapter 3, if we assume that the Lösch’s objective in 
constructing a hierarchy was the realization of the economies of agglomeration, then the central place 
system in Figure 15 is one such solution. In other words, what can be understood from the model in 
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objective function (33) is that the difference between Christaller’s and Lösch’s theories in terms of 
hierarchical arrangement is nothing other than the decision of whether to prioritize the hierarchy of 
the overall system or to prioritize the behavior of individual firms. 
In Lösch’s market area theory, which lay emphasis on the behavior of individual firms, complete 
agglomeration is never realized outside of a metropolis. The agglomeration effect of goods is 
considered only secondarily. However, the maximum agglomeration effect is not achieved by 
prioritizing location in particular sectors as attempted by Lösch. Even where prioritizing location itself 
to be an objective, it is possible to create more “city-rich sectors” than Lösch’s results, as revealed in 
Chapter 3. If Lösch believed that prioritizing location in particular sectors would lead to the most 
rational solution for the superimposition problem for market area networks, he was only chasing 
phantoms. 
On the other hand, Christaller’s central place theory, which is premised on complete 
agglomeration, encourages adaptive behavior on the supply of each good by firm in order to prefer 
the agglomeration effect. As a result, goods of differing orders are associated with market area 
networks of the same size. This naturally produces differences in the profits that can be achieved by 
each good. The goods with different size of the upper limit of the range are usually thought to differ 
also in terms of the threshold and the market area needed by existence of firm, but the economic 
rationality of individual firms is unquestioned solely on the basis that they are “more elastic.” 
In conclusion, it may be said that both Christaller and Lösch envisioned a model that specialized 
on one or the other of the two objectives in objective function (33). However, in practice, as indicated 
in the previous section, there exists a plurality of central place systems made up of many different 
types of hierarchical structure between the two inversely related objectives. Moreover, while the 
superimposition problem for market area networks assumes the uniform distribution of settlements 
and potential firm locations, population distributions and traffic networks are not uniform in reality, 
resulting in the formation of market area networks of different shapes and sizes. Therefore, when 
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applying the model to the real world, it follows that a model that achieves hierarchical arrangement 
without resorting to geometric processing is essential. 
The first term of objective function (33), which minimizes the total number of missing goods, 
determines whether firms will be located at a node j through the endogenous variable Yjm. Because Yjm 
is also included in Equation (32), which corresponds to the second term of objective function (33), it 
can also be applied in the case of a non-uniform population distribution such as was attempted in 
Chapter 2 or a problem that assumes a point distribution with even greater irregularity. While it 
depends on how the locational principle for single good is defined, the model of objective function 
(33), which captures flexible hierarchies based on the agglomeration effect of goods, can be defined 
as a generalized model of central place theory that subsumes the theories of both Christaller and 
Lösch and can be applied to real-world problems.  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this paper, I have formulated the model that reproduces theoretical central place systems using 
a mathematical programming comprising some constraints and an objective function. Further, by 
placing particular focus on the structure of the model, I elaborated an attempt to reinterpret 
systematically both theories of Christaller and Lösch. 
What can be understood from modelling Lösch’s theory, first of all, is that Lösch’s market area 
theory for the location of single good can be reproduced as a total demand maximization problem. 
Unlike the model developed in Kuby (1989), the model presented in this paper offers a corrected 
formulation of Lösch’s objective in terms of the process of locational equilibrium and conditions such 
as demand allocation. Accordingly, it may be considered to stand as an operational model of Lösch’s 
market area theory that enables the derivation of realistic central place systems, taking into account a 
more relaxed set of assumptions. Meanwhile, if Lösch’s hierarchical arrangement is modelled as a 
superimposition problem for market area networks, Lösch’s central place systems are not reproduced, 
with the model deriving its own rational solution with regard to prioritizing location in particular 
sectors. The fact that the optimality of Lösch’s system is not supported, even when the Lösch’s 
objective in constructing a hierarchy is reinterpreted as leveraging the agglomeration effect of goods, 
indicates that Lösch’s method in constructing a hierarchy lacks a perspective on the rationality of the 
entire system. 
When we reinterpret Christaller’s central place theory by extending the model of Lösch’s market 
area theory, the former can be considered as a generalized median problem as opposed to the latter, 
which is a total demand maximization problem. Furthermore, when Christaller’s central place theory 
is regarded as a superimposition problem for market area networks, assuming the variable number of 
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market centers envisioned in the generalized median problem, each good can be associated with 
multiple market area networks of different sizes. Thus, as a result of applying the extended model of 
Lösch’s hierarchical arrangement, we succeeded in reproducing a central place system based on 
Christaller’s marketing principle when prioritizing the agglomeration effect of goods. That is, in the 
sense of deriving the optimal solution in terms of hierarchical structure, Christaller’s method may be 
considered more successful at deriving a rational solution than that of Lösch. 
However, both theories are the same in the meaning of premising on special kinds of central place 
systems. In this paper, I have presented a generalized model that places the agglomeration effect of 
goods in opposition to the locational principle for single good, and identified Lösch’s and Christaller’s 
theories systematically. Consequently, we can recognize the former precedes the locational principle 
for single good while the latter prioritizes the agglomeration effect of goods. 
It should be obvious why these had to be respectively conceived as antithetical objectives. Both 
Christaller and Lösch thought that there were an infinite number of kinds of goods to be considered 
originally. If it is assumed that the range and the threshold are slightly different depending on each 
good, then the distance between market centers will also change only a little. It would be almost 
impossible to solve a superimposition problem for an infinite number of market area networks whose 
interval of market centers are spaced at slightly different from one another. Hence, Lösch, assuming a 
point distribution of discrete settlements, replaced the superimposition problem with a combinatorial 
problem on finite set by specifying one of the market area networks in accordance with a threshold 
for each good. On the other hand, Christaller, by assuming a pattern of complete agglomeration in 
which market centers of higher-order goods must necessarily integrate all lower-order centers, 
succeeded in fixing the market centers on a continuous plane. 
While Lösch regarded Christaller’s central place systems as a special case of his own “complete 
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systems” (Lösch 1954: 130-132)26, it is apparent from the discussion in this paper that Christaller’s 
central place system was no such thing. Certainly, Christaller’s central place system comprised a part 
of the market area networks of various sizes that Lösch considered. Nevertheless, this was a product 
of the fact that these market area networks were aggregated by complete agglomeration and a varying 
number of market centers. As we can imagine from a comparison of Figures 11 and 17, Christaller 
captured the correspondence between goods and market area networks more flexibly than Lösch. The 
rational central place systems that realized complete agglomeration, obtained as a result of this 
flexibility, are incompatible with those of Lösch, which lacked rationality from the perspective of a 
whole system. To begin with, there is no containment relationship between the two central place 
systems, which are formed with different objectives and processes. Further, while these findings have 
been partially indicated in previous studies (e.g., Morikawa 1980; Hayashi 1986), it seems that the 
locus of the problem and differences between the two theories can be clarified by revisiting the 
question anew from a model-building perspective. 
Incidentally, the generalized model in objective function (33), presented when reinterpreting 
Christaller’s and Lösch's theories, embodies the potential to bring central place theory closer to reality 
in the sense that it can derive the various central place systems that are present in both theories. 
Real-world central place systems are not limited to those that satisfy the description of regular 
hexagonal market area networks, even when populations are uniformly distributed. Depending on the 
location pattern for each good, there could be cases where market area networks can take shape in 
various other ways, such as triangular and quadrilateral. When deriving central place systems based 
on the superimposition problem for market area networks elaborated in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, the 
addition of options for market areas to correspond with goods in ways other than through these 
regular hexagons makes it possible to verify their consistency with real-world central place systems 
                                               
26 By “complete” (vollständig) Lösch meant that he had taken into account market area networks of 
varying sizes. However, he also points out that it is “not all possible market areas need occur in 
reality” (Lösch 1954: 120). 
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such as those of Parr (1978, 1980, 1981), which assume a general hierarchical model. In addition, the 
model for objective function (33) can be regarded as a generalized model for the problem of 
hierarchical facility location problems. The second term on the right-hand side of objective function 
(33), as classified in Table 5, is associated with the existing location-allocation models often invoked 
in the facility location problems. Conventionally, in the hierarchical facility location problems, a 
facility hierarchy is assumed to have either successively inclusive or successively exclusive of the 
goods and services being supplied27, which are defined in a model by constraints (Narula 1984; Şahin 
and Süral 2007). In objective function (33), which employs multiobjective programming, because the 
condition of facility hierarchy is incorporated into the first term of the right-hand side, it will be 
possible to construct this hierarchy gradually in the move from successively inclusive of goods to 
successively exclusive of goods. From the standpoint of application in terms of theorizing the 
planning of central place theory (Sugiura 2013), it is possible to say that the model presented in this 
paper, in addition to being applicable in proposing plans for the layout of real-world facilities and 
cities, can also be invoked as an analytical model for understanding the locational principle and 
processes of hierarchy when locating central place systems and events in the real world. 
In the context of the re-examination of central place theory that has been taking place in recent 
years with a focus on spatial economics, the significance and limits of central place theory are being 
questioned anew (e.g., Mulligan et al. 2012). For the purpose of realizing this re-examination of the 
theory, the aims of this paper are consistent with these research trajectory. However, before debating 
the validity of central place theory, I believe that there is still some work needed to understand the 
implications of classical central place theory, which does not seem to have been thoroughly discussed. 
This paper is one such attempt. As mentioned at the beginning, the significance of using mathematical 
                                               
27 Successively inclusive refers to higher-order facilities being in possession of the goods and services 
provided by lower-order facilities, while successively exclusive denotes a situation where facilities 
at each level of a hierarchy are in possession of their respective specialized goods and services 
(Ishizaki 2003). The former corresponds to hierarchy in Christaller’s central place systems, while 
the latter corresponds to that in Lösch’s central place systems. 
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techniques to reinterpret theories of Christaller and Lösch, who had no choice but to rely on 
descriptive and geometric explanations, has not decreased in the slightest. 
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